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

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TRB

FROM WASHINGTON

Hacks And Quacks

Conservatives have long suspected that the media are "politically liberal and alienated from traditional norms and institutions," but until now they lacked scientific proof. Sociologists S. Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda S. Lichter (henceforth, LRL) address this lack in their new book, *The Media Elite*, a tendentious piece of pseudo-scientific rubbish of just the sort that drives conservatives up the wall when it doesn't serve their purposes.

LRL begin with a poll comparing the views of supposed members of the "media elite" with those of business executives. Questions demanding assent or dissent to a list of prepackaged attitudes are more an exercise in manufacturing opinion than in measuring it. Nevertheless, it's no surprise that the journalists turned out to be more liberal than businessmen. Actually, in answer to one particularly idiotic question, the journalists and the business types both chose "economic stability" as "the most important value" for the coming decade. "However," LRL caution, "almost half the media elite . . . pick postbourgeois values as their second choice. . . . Forty percent of these leading journalists select a humane society as either their first or second priority." How awful.

Among other bits of scientific "proof," journalists were shown fake news stories and asked to summarize them. In summarizing a story about a report from a civil rights organization on the widening gap between black and white incomes, 52 percent failed to pick up on references to earlier studies reaching the opposite conclusion. Well you see, there is this concept in the news business known as "news." A new study is news. An old study is not news. Forced to summarize a story that is only three paragraphs to begin with, the temptation to leave out the part that is not news is not evidence of ideological predisposition.

My favorite bit of pseudo-science is the "Thematic Apperception Test," something like a Rorschach, in which the participants were shown vague but suggestive pictures (reproduced in the book) and asked to make up stories about them. Conclusion: "The journalists scored higher on the need for power, fear of power, and narcissism, while the businessmen scored higher on the need for achievement and the capacity for intimacy." LRL coyly describe the first picture in this experiment as "two uniformed men flanking a third, who wears a different uniform." Perhaps it's just my liberal bias showing through, but to me the uniform and facial expression of the man in the middle clearly designate him as subservient. So I'm not shocked that journalists tended to come up with stories of political prisoners and oppressed farm workers. Nor am I clear why it should be considered alarming if journalists are somewhat quicker than businessmen to suspect that an ambiguous situation may mean that perhaps someone is being oppressed.

A large chunk of *The Media Elite* is taken up with "scientific content analysis" of the media coverage of some recent controversies. "Scientific content analysis" means that LRL compare the media's treatment of these issues with conclusions drawn from their own surveys of "experts" and the technical literature on the subjects. LRL actually score some points in these case studies. But their pretension to scientific method is a joke.

By consulting "experts" in an effort to determine the truth, for purposes of comparison to what journalists produce, LRL are doing just what journalists themselves do every day. Why is the "truth" LRL arrive at through this familiar method necessarily more objective than that of their subjects? Why are they free of the psychological blinders that limit the press? If LRL think that no one will quibble with their choice of experts or their use of the expertise on a subject like nuclear power, they are naive indeed. And if they contend that they—unlike the "media elite"—began their inquiries into subjects such as busing and oil company profits with no predisposition or bias about what their conclusion might be, they're fooling no one.

In analyzing this issue of press bias, it's helpful to break it down into four

continued on page 41

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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CORRESPONDENCE

MORALITY & GUERRILLA WAR

To the editors:

Charles Krauthammer's "Morality and the Reagan Doctrine" (September 8) is the most closely reasoned analysis of that crucial question that I have seen. But support for the *contras* is not as strongly supported by relevant criteria as Krauthammer believes. I propose a criterion that, while not invalidating most of his points, would be overriding. When in doubt, don't.

Military involvement in the internal struggles of another nation should be undertaken only if a compelling case, recognized by the public and most foreign policy specialists, can be made. Since the American people overwhelmingly oppose intervention in Nicaragua, most foreign policy students are dubious about intervention, most Latin American countries oppose our role, and the best (if inconclusive) evidence suggests that most Nicaraguans do not back the *contras*, should the administration (and TNR) endorse intervention nonetheless? Aren't prudence and respect for democratic premises important components of morality?

If there is any area where majority support for public policy is imperative, it is in the exercise or subsidization of large-scale violence. Abandon that principle and you open the door to the kinds of abuses of presidential power that a self-governing people cannot condone.

REO M. CHRISTENSON
Professor of Political Science
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio

To the editors:

Charles Krauthammer's hard-punching moral guide to guerrilla war was, nevertheless, disheartening. It implies that any democracy is morally justified in interventionism, so long as it is backing or enforcing its values. (It would help if the side a particular democracy favors can claim to be playing clean.) It implies too that any non-democratic nation is similarly morally justified should it consider its values superior to those of democracy.

But this is, and always has been, the stance of religious zealots, terrorists, and imperialistic powers of assorted ideologies. Their crimes against humanity have been justified by the claim to be pursuing "higher" or "spiritual" values. Clearly what Krauthammer is advocating on the international scene is nothing but a continuation of a Hobbesian state of nature.

DAVID G. EVERALL
San Francisco, California

To the editors:

The development of the doctrine of non-intervention and its relationship to security and democratic government was somewhat different in the Western Hemisphere than described in "Morality and the Reagan Doctrine."

The non-intervention doctrine, or anti-interventionism, was advanced by the United States very early in its history as a concept to get European monarchies out of the hemisphere and to keep them out. Its first clear expression as a national policy was the Monroe Doctrine. As a corollary, we developed the policy that we would be responsible for keeping the newly independent Latin countries from doing anything that might provide an excuse for European intervention.

The pressure from Latin America, led by Mexico, for the United States to stop intervening in Central America and the Caribbean reached its climax in 1936. The United States wanted the cooperation of Latin America if the storm then brewing in Europe should spread to the hemisphere. In response to Latin America's pledge of cooperation on U.S. security concerns, President Roosevelt accepted a non-intervention convention. These joint and reciprocal pledges were later incorporated in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) of 1947 and the OAS Charter of 1948.

Thomas Jefferson held that the United States would be best protected if it were surrounded by democratic countries. Thus, the United States had no difficulty whatever in its early history in providing military equipment to guerrillas who were fighting for national independence and democratic government.

The fundamental problem with the Contadora process is that its leaders are pressing the doctrine of non-intervention to the complete exclusion of Latin America's reciprocal pledge on the security of the hemisphere. At issue in Central America is the inter-American system as agreed to in 1936, and finally consolidated after World War II. Quite clearly, the Soviet objective is to destroy that system by undermining both democratic government in Latin America and the collective security that is second nature among like-minded democratic governments.

ROBERT M. SAYRE
Washington, D.C.

To the editors:

Charles Krauthammer's suggestion that we use the tests of popular support, ends, and means as criteria for American support of insurgencies makes a great deal of sense. So does his argument that the current insurgency in Cambodia, because of its Khmer Rouge connections, fails the test of ends and therefore should not be supported. Why, then, doesn't he apply this same argument to the Nicaraguan *contras*, some of whose military officers are reported to be former Somoza National Guardsmen? True, the political leaders of the *contras* do not share this unsavory past; many fought Somoza alongside the Sandinistas. Upon victory, however, they were unable to shape Nicaragua's new government. How can we be sure they would be any more successful in preventing a return to a Somoza-like regime? Can the United States, in good conscience, take this risk? I don't believe we should.

ROBERT MCMAHON
Lansdowne, Pennsylvania

To the editors:

Charles Krauthammer's compelling essay drives a stake through the heart of pseudo-moralists—liberals and conservatives alike who employ selective moral standards to support preordained political positions. In his defense of the Reagan doctrine, Krauthammer displays a Niebuhrian understanding of the awful difficulty, and necessity, we face in ascribing a moral imperative on issues of war and insurgency.

PETER WEHNER
Special Assistant to the President
Ethics and Public Policy Center
Washington, D.C.

To the editors:

Summary of Krauthammer's well-crafted piece on guerrilla war: the USA should not be engaged in supporting a guerrilla war. However, since in certain instances it is the lesser of two evils, we need to use it. But we should make the war as nice as possible.

PORTER FRENCH
Grinnell, Iowa

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THE NEW REPUBLIC
OCTOBER 20, 1986

WHERE'S THE MORAL FIRE?

In May 1985 Democratic national chairman Paul Kirk rounded up 100 Democratic elected officials and told them "to identify, summarize, and communicate a vision of a national Democratic Party and assert its claim on the future." Translation: figure out what the party believes in, and explain why Americans should do in 1988 what they have done only once since 1964—elect a Democrat president. It's disappointing enough that such an exercise is still necessary. What's even more dispiriting is the 71-page product of the Democratic Policy Commission's labors, "New Choices in a Changing America."

Before writing its report, the commission went on a field trip around the nation, talking to elected Democratic state and local officials: "Our journey through grass-roots America brought us face to face with changing realities." Most impressive of these changing realities is the upheaval in the American *demos*. Jobs and careers are being created and destroyed at a record pace. People entering the work force today may have as many as three careers and six or seven jobs before retirement. In most families both spouses work; their hectic schedules leave them exhausted and isolated from their neighbors. And more than 25 percent of all families are headed by a single parent. The commission might have added that the United States has the world's highest divorce rate. Sixty percent of all children will spend part of childhood with just one parent.

But do the Democrats really grasp the implications of their findings? Over the last two decades, the party has been losing its social base. Partly this is because greater numbers of poor and moderate-income voters—historically the most loyal Democrats—are not bothering to vote. But more important, many Democratic voters have deserted to the Republicans: big-city ethnics, Catholics, Southern whites, and even many union members. Fewer of these people felt they could still identify with the powerful constituent groups within the party. The electorate consists increasingly of middle- and upper-class people voting their pocketbooks, and of lower- and working-class voters expressing resentment toward liberal positions on social issues and foreign policy.

But people are not only less interested in being Democrats, they're less concerned with belonging to *any* party. This is partly why it is not clear that recent Republican gains will outlast Reagan. Party affiliation is produced and reinforced by other commitments: to a family, a community, a job, a union. If someone spends her life changing careers (and maybe spouses) two or three times, perhaps moving several times in the process, is it likely that she will form a consistent pattern of voting for one party—much less of involvement in party affairs? So the Democrats face a doubly difficult task: not only that of winning back their old social base, but also of winning over a public to which the very idea of party loyalty seems increasingly foreign.

Does the policy commission report help? In one sense, yes. It tries to avoid simply presenting lists of the demands of the party's constituent groups. Its appeal to families, as opposed to "women, blacks, Hispanics, working people," is a refreshing departure. And it is no mere parroting of the Republican right's family theme. The Democrats have a more realistic picture of the post-Ozzie-and-Harriet family. Their calls for such innovations as affordable, widely available day care and flexible working hours set them clearly apart from the Republican right's notion of returning to the good old days of "traditional values," when Mom stayed home with the kids. Day care and parental leave could be issues that break sharply in the Democrats' favor in 1988.

But the document offers few other reasons to hope the Democrats will be able to forge a majority out of the shifting American electorate. It reads like the work of Washington policy drones, not leaders. The commission adopts a tone of coolheaded pragmatism. Apparently the idea is that, since Democrats are good at getting elected governor and mayor, the way to extend that political success to the national level is to show voters how local Democratic officials are "making it work." But the White House isn't a statehouse. The public demands more from its national leaders than problem solving. It wants a vision of the good society, and of government's role in achieving that vision. Reagan won in 1980 and 1984 by presenting his view, charged with moral passion, of the good society. You

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can quarrel with that vision (as we do). But during his campaigns, everyone knew what Ronald Reagan believed in: a strong defense, traditional values, and low taxes.

The policy commission report leaves America guessing what the Democrats' vision might be. The party is clearly still deeply divided. Where past party statements may have handled divisions by declaring in favor of everyone's demands, the commission seeks to gloss over differences by declaring itself in favor only of vague general notions that no one could object to. It offers few specific clues about the Democrats' vision of the common good, or of how that vision differs from Republican ideals. The overall picture is of a defensive, timid, and confused party.

The commission offers a set of Democratic "core beliefs,"

THE ZEITGEIST CHECKLIST

BY CHARLES PAUL FREUND

This Week		Last Week	Weeks on Chart
1.	IN THE BLINK OF AN EYE	1	5

Daniloff cum summit. Nobody was surprised that Daniloff was released, but the speed with which the affair was brought to a close is impressive indeed. Almost as impressive was the smoothness with which Gorbachev's interrupted "openness" campaign got back into gear, and the receptivity of the Western press to it. The Soviets invited the journalists to visit an underground nuclear testing site even before Daniloff was out. Now all the spy talk is being replaced by the on-the-doorstep summit, which will release a media torrent of an entirely different sort. Nicholas who?

2.	LOOP-DE-LOOPHOLE	*	3

Taxes. So many questions had been raised about the effects of the tax bill that by the time it passed, it had slipped from being a legislative triumph to being a national economic crap shoot. Helpful *USA Today* even opened a telephone Tax Line (to go with its Drug Line), an action that is becoming a sign of national confusion. Meanwhile, advertisers are gearing up campaigns urging you to buy everything you can now, while you can still deduct the sales tax. Ask not what you can do for your deficits.

3.	NAKASONE BALONEY	—	1

Japan. Now we know how the Chinese and Koreans feel. Prime Minister Nakasone's breathtakingly impolitic remarks should actually have come as little surprise; witness the trouble the Japanese have had for years just trying describe their actions in World War II. Suggestions that this may spur offended American blue-collars into a more intense struggle against Japan Inc., however, are just wishful thinking.

4.	SANCTIONING APARTHEID	—	1

South Africa. Has South Africa's clampdown on news done it any good? The House's pro-sanction override of Reagan's veto indicates irresistible popular sentiment against the Botha government. Anti-sanction moderates, especially Chief Buthelezi, are bereft of public ground on which to stand. While virtually all leading apartheid critics focus their attention on ANC figures such as Nelson Mandela, Buthelezi is reduced to writing frequent letters to American newspapers.

5.	ONE TOKE OVER THE LINE	3	6

Drugs. What drug crisis? Attention has turned from drugs to drug hysteria to hysteria mongering; the editor of *Newsweek* actually had to defend all those summer drug covers on PBS last week. Meanwhile, the Senate is toning down the House's anti-drug measures, and op-ed writers and others are trying to join drug concerns to the Stop Smoking and Drunk Driving campaigns to forge an all-purpose crusade against Addiction. That's not how crusades work, of course; it targets too many people's behavior, diminishing the critical mass of popular sanctimony.

6.	DRESSED TO KILL	2	2

Terrorism. The Parisian reign of terror may have slipped off your front page, but the aftereffects are big in the trade journals. Moviemakers are lamenting the empty Parisian theaters, for one. Worse, it is fashion show season, and designers are concerned that American buyers will find Italian clothes irresistible this year. France actually dispatched its tourism minister here to call attention to its strict security measures.

7.	THE SONG CONTINUES	—	1

Missing Kids. The sequel to TV's "Adam" movie, the original of which sparked last year's Missing Kids mania, aroused mostly yawns this year. Of course, this is a crusade that long since worked its way down to milk cartons and direct-mail ad coupons, but though nobody much talks about it now, it hasn't gone away. Spot-news photographers, for example, are complaining that they can't grab "cute kid" shots anymore. As soon as they start lurking furtively in the wake of some promising child, his folks angrily demand some ID.

8.	YUPPIE PLAGUE	—	1

Health. An estimated 20 percent of the Hollywood filmmaking community has come down with something called Epstein-Barr, a non-fatal but incurable condition causing fatigue, depression, and a bewildering array of other symptoms. The EB virus is a long-recognized one— it's been linked to mononucleosis—but the disease (or its diagnosis) seems limited to bright, articulate people aged 22-44 who have stressful jobs. A few doctors have carefully mentioned a possible "overdiagnosis," but nobody's compared this to the Mad Gasser of Matoon yet.

9.	A DILEMMA OF THE HORN	—	1

Famine. Was the West somehow bamboozled when it came to Ethiopia's aid last year? A wave of post-mortem commentary, from *Encounter* to *Readers' Digest* to the *New York Times*, argues that the Ethiopian government failed to react responsibly to famine conditions, intensified the famine, and used Western aid in a wholly political fashion against its opponents. Having aided a Soviet puppet, the White House interestingly enough has not yet tried couching its opposition to South African sanctions in terms of this available flip side.

10.	MORE LIKE IT HOT	—	1

Food. Maybe Popeye's is to blame, or maybe it's the influx of immigrants with their own hot cuisines. Whatever it is, Americans are using far more spice these days than the bland diet has called for since the decline of regionalism. In the last ten years alone, Americans have upped their intake of pepper by 18 million pounds, consumed nearly three million more pounds of oregano, over three million more pounds of basil, and 16 million more pounds of cinnamon. So that's why sales of wine coolers have doubled in the past year.

*Item resurfaces in the Zeitgeist after at least one week's absence.

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duly swearing allegiance to "a growing economy," "strong state and local governments," "basic moral values," and "achievement and progress." The party thus distinguishes itself from everyone who is against these wonderful things. Yet the report shrinks from offering concrete examples of how some of these deeply held values would apply in practice. One core belief is that "the freedom to make personal choices is at the heart of the American dream." Another is "we must make equal opportunity for all a reality." But the report has nothing to say about two matters that go to the heart of personal choice and equal opportunity: abortion and affirmative action. The words don't even appear.

As the commission notes, America's economic health requires reducing the federal deficit. "No part of the budget should be exempt" from spending cuts, the report says. "We need priorities and decision rules." But it gives no hint as to what the Democrats' rules are. The commission takes the easy way out, calling for an end to defense waste and better tax collection—positions favored by everyone and taken seriously by no one. Social Security now makes up a quarter of the federal budget. Does the party still consider it off-limits to cuts? The report doesn't address the subject. The commission even suggests that we can grow our way out of the deficit, a proposal for which Ronald Reagan was rightly ridiculed by Walter Mondale in the 1984 campaign. The report timidly says that "sometimes even . . . increasing taxes" may be necessary. There is no indication whether the Democratic Party believes higher taxes are necessary now, and has an idea of who should pay them, or if it agrees with Reagan that nobody should pay higher taxes.

And where do the Democrats stand on protectionism? The commission comes out for free trade, declaring that higher productivity alone will buy America a more competitive economy. Indeed, one of the report's strong points is its call for greater investment in job training, education, and infrastructure in order to boost the overall competitiveness of the American economy. Yet the commission can't resist hedging on protectionism, an apparent nod in the direction of pro-import-quota Democrats in Congress: "Where other nations exclude specific American products as a way to protect their infant industries or shore up declining industries . . . we will have to respond," it says. In all the flip-flopping, the commission makes only token reference to one promising new idea for redressing America's trade imbalance with our allies: making them shoulder a bigger share of their defense burden.

THE ONLY ISSUE in the entire report about which the commission declares "there can be no compromise" is "credit relief targeted to credit-worthy farmers." Farmers, of course, got over $60 billion in government subsidies under the last farm bill and will get over $30 billion this year under the new one. The distinction between "credit-worthy" farmers and the rest is phony. The commission is simply pandering to agriculture under the guise of tough-minded rhetoric. Credit-worthy farmers can get loans from a bank. They don't need subsidized loans from the government. Clearly the commission isn't prepared to take bold action to wean the rural economy from the public teat. "Republican ideologues believe that we should surrender the rural economy to the wolves of the marketplace," the report asserts. Is that the same free market that the commission hails elsewhere for bringing growth and efficiency?

THE COMMISSION never really tackles the question of economic equity. To be sure, it comes out solidly for tax reform. But that is now a fait accompli. What else do Democrats have to offer? If the party has one lingering political advantage, it is that it is still considered the party of fairness. That is the theme Democrats should be using against the Republicans. It is not enough to state vacuously that "the best way to help people who are hurting is by creating more choices and opportunities." The real test comes when the government has to ask the people to accept necessary sacrifices for the common good. Democrats should be explaining not only that they stand for sharing the benefits of a growing economy—that's an easy one—but that they will make sure necessary sacrifices, like tax increases, fall most heavily on those most able to bear them.

Democrats should not be afraid to campaign on the theme of a fairer society. They should not be afraid to say that fairness may at times mean a bigger role for the federal government. Above all they shouldn't be afraid to update their own vision of fairness. The point isn't to abandon the constituencies, but to abandon those groups that refuse to incorporate their narrow interests into a larger vision of the public interest.

Democrats should be the party that says, unequivocally, that it isn't fair to subsidize farmers at the expense of taxpayers and grocery buyers who are, on the average, poorer than farmers. Nor is it fair to insulate Social Security from budget cuts, ignoring the fact that the program mainly benefits the middle class and gets its revenues from a payroll tax that falls disproportionately on the poor. And it isn't fair to impose import quotas that defend the above-average wages of union labor at the cost of higher prices for everyone else. The commission only offers a tepid, unconvincing endorsement of what would be a fair policy in the first of these examples: strictly targeting farm aid to the poorest farmers, and no others. It dares not propose an overhaul of the regressive payroll tax.

Only a clear appeal—an appeal with some moral fire to it—will help the Democrats construct a new majority out of an electorate increasingly made up of voters who are rootless politically, and who are still struggling to keep up economically. The Democratic Policy Commission confuses majority support for Ronald Reagan with majority support for every Reagan policy. It wrongly concludes that the public will be persuaded to vote Democratic by vague indications that the Democrats, too, are for efficiency. In fact, polls consistently show that the public doesn't agree with Reagan's policies. But just as consistently polls show that Americans do like the fact that Reagan is capable of articulating a strongly held set of beliefs. If this report is any indication, the Democrats still haven't mastered that basic skill of national leadership. □

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DICTATOR'S DEGREE

Imagine an American university bestowing on Chilean president Augusto Pinochet the honorary degree of doctor of laws. Actually you would have to imagine an even more preposterous spectacle—and a more preposterous honoree, perhaps Jorge Videla, former dictator of Argentina, or Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Empire—to approximate the act of moral callousness that took place this past week at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. It's not just Zimbabwean prime minister Robert Mugabe's almost unfailing support for Soviet policy in world politics that makes him so objectionable a recipient of an honorary doctor of laws degree. It is that he presides over a lawless state whose coercive routines include kidnappings, disappearances, deliberate starvation of citizens, torture, vigilantism, summary executions, and just plain murder—mass murder, in fact.

In a blithe and uncomprehending defense of the honoree, the campus chancellor, Joseph Duffey (chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities under Jimmy Carter), spoke of the economic gains achieved under the Mugabe regime. It's the old and hoary apologia for tyrannies. There's no surprise that Duffey (who, once as a U.S. Senate candidate in Connecticut, called himself a revisionist Marxist) should prove to be indifferent to what are still casually dismissed among many left-wing academics as bourgeois liberties. Yet it's important to note that what is happening in Zimbabwe is not violations of human rights or civil liberties, but systematic denials of these rights and liberties. What is at issue is not merely a police-directed press or detentions without trial, but a barbarism that is at once a deliberate strategy and a tactic of a regime that haughtily preaches compassionate morality to the West.

Some of this has been scrupulously documented by Amnesty International, an organization that folk like Duffey are usually inclined to trust on such matters. But then, Mugabe has dismissed Amnesty's evidence as a "heap of rubbish" and the agency itself as Amnesty Lies International; and maybe in Amherst that is enough of a refutation. But the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Catholic bishops of the country have also documented the harrowing experiences of individual victims and whole categories of people targeted by the state security and military apparatus. And not, by the way, targeted discriminatingly. Here is U. Mass's new doctor of laws on the subject: "Where men and women provide food for the dissidents, when we get there we eradicate them. We don't differentiate when we fight, because we can't tell who is a dissident and who is not."

Duffey also said that Mugabe had "laid the foundation for racial harmony between blacks and whites." This is, to say the least, a bit of hyperbole. In any case, it's not whites who are the primary victims of Mugabe's rule. It's the black people of the Ndebele tribe. Their particular tormentors are the forces in Zimbabwean society that are particularly loyal to Mugabe himself. The notorious Fifth Brigade, for example, trained not by the British but by the North Koreans, was organized precisely to carry out Mugabe's will. Many thousands of innocents have been killed in their sweeps through Matabeleland. Another repressive instrument of the Mugabe dictatorship is a network of vigilante groups—the Youth Brigade, the Youth Wing, and the People's Militia—which, modeled on China's Red Guards, suggests rather more the young Pol Potian fanatics of Cambodia. A preferred action of both Mugabe's Fifth Brigade and the younger faithful is to enter a village and burn its houses, its crops, and its people. The most depressing evidence of such enormities is mustered in *Zimbabwe: Wages of War*, a coolheaded and wholly non-ideological account published in May by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.

Ian Smith did not leave Zimbabwe a happy place. And Mugabe may not be the very cruelest of dictators in post-colonial Africa. The standard on this, after all, is Idi Amin, who often killed and imprisoned to no clear purpose. That cannot be said of Mugabe. But it is still a scandal to the canons of civilized life, said to be enshrined in universities, to honor such a man. That U. Mass-Amherst has done so may be a sign that Duffey has a demanding Third World constituency that he thinks he needs to conciliate. But it is a sign of an almost unbelievable treason of the intellectuals that this university tribute to a tyrant should have been contemplated at all.

NOTEBOOK

□ WELCOME BACK: With this issue, Morton Kondracke rejoins THE NEW REPUBLIC as senior editor. Mort joined TNR in 1977 as executive editor, writing almost every week for eight years about foreign and domestic policy, politics, and the White House. Early last year, he left us to become Washington bureau chief of *Newsweek*. But he apparently missed TNR as much as we certainly missed him. This time around, Mort intends to concentrate on foreign affairs, about which he will be our principal writer. But from time to time his pen may stray in other directions as well. At least we hope so.

□ ONE BOOK, TWO REVIEWERS: "Eisenhower does have a tendency, common to the generation that followed the war, to regard the outcome as never in doubt, and to argue that the issue was settled early on."—Professor Stephen Ambrose reviewing *Eisenhower At War* by David Eisenhower, TNR, October 6. "David Eisenhower . . . reminds us that victory was not nearly so certain at the time as it may seem in the security of hindsight. [He] does what the good historian must do—restore the uncertainty and obscurity of developments when their outcome is still unknown."—Professor Arthur Schlesinger reviewing *Eisenhower At War* in the *New York Times Book Review*, September 14.

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□ POST-POST-WATERGATE MORALITY: The *Wall Street Journal*, in a September 25 article about the gusher of campaign contributions Senator Alfonse D'Amato has received from the financial community, reported that several E. F. Hutton executives listed as having contributed to D'Amato don't remember having done so. It seems pretty clear that someone else made these contributions in their names (which is illegal) in order to evade the $1,000 limit on individual donations to Senate candidates. It's a sad sign of how far we've come from the days of post-Watergate morality, when this clear evidence of corruption might have been the lead of a story on a senator's campaign finances, that the *Journal* put the information in a sidebar on page 10. D'Amato's hometown paper, the *New York Times*, reported it only in the context of a complaint by D'Amato's Democratic opponent, Mark Green. That made page 44.

□ CORRECTION: Due to a transmission error, last week's Cambridge Diarist described George Bachrach, who lost the Democratic primary in the eighth district of Massachusetts to Joe Kennedy, as having "inveighed reluctantly" against President Reagan's bombing of Libya. That should have read "inveighed relentlessly."

WHITE HOUSE WATCH

JOKEMASTER GENERAL

Sioux Falls, South Dakota

Did you hear the one about the three guys and the locked car? If not, you probably haven't dropped by one of President Reagan's campaign rallies this fall. Seems the three find themselves locked out and one says, "Give me a coat hanger. I can straighten it out and get in." But the second guy declares, "You can't do that. Somebody'll think you're stealing the car." Then, the third fellow pipes up urgently, "Well, we better do something pretty quick because it's starting to rain and the top's down."

The joke is a Reagan favorite. He used it September 18 in Montgomery, Alabama, while speaking on behalf of Senator Jeremiah Denton, one of 20 Republican senators seeking re-election. That time, the president turned the joke on leaders of the Democratic Party, arguing they've lost touch with the rank and file. "When I think of them, I think of that little story about the three fellows that came out one day to get their car. . . ." Reagan exhumed the joke in Kansas City, Missouri, on September 29, when he appeared at a steamy airport rally for Christopher Bond, who's running for the Senate seat of retiring Democrat Thomas Eagleton. "You know," the president said, "some of the people in charge in the Congress, and the other side—they remind me of a story about three—they're sort of like the three fellows that came out of a building [and] found . . ."

Reagan loves a good joke—in public, he cleans up the ethnic ones and skips the off-color—and he loves campaigning. If nothing else, it provides him with a wealth of new material, new stories. In Alabama, he stood in a receiving line. One state legislator came up and said he wanted to get married but was shy about proposing. He asked Reagan to relay a proposal to his intended, who was standing right there. Reagan complied, and the woman said yes. Back aboard Air Force One, Reagan couldn't wait to pass on the story. He put on the sweat pants that he wears on the plane and walked back to the section for junior staff to recount it. On the way to New Orleans earlier that day, he had joked with the young staffers about heading for Sin City. The minions laughed uproariously.

Everybody has a good time on Reagan's campaign trips, and Republican candidates get warm endorsements. But Reagan has little substance to convey. He is not touting a last-gasp agenda for his presidency. His message is largely a negative one: keep the Senate in Republican hands so the tax-and-spend Democrats don't take over again. "They're waiting in the wings, ready to act if they recapture the United States Senate," Reagan told a crowd of 8,000 in Sioux Falls, where he flew on September 29 after a stop in Kansas City. Thwart them by re-electing Senator James Abdnor, he said. Abdnor missed the Sioux Falls event, staying in Washington because of a special twist in his own campaign in South Dakota. He is exploiting the issue of missed votes in Congress by his opponent, Democratic Representative Tom Daschle, and was fearful of having it backfire on him.

Reagan, the great wholesaler of political themes, has become a retail politician in his latest stump incarnation. In Georgia in early October, Reagan touted the line-item veto because it's the one issue that Senator Mack Mattingly is identified with. Mitch Daniels, the White House political director, called it "a national issue with a local hook." In Kansas City, Reagan praised Bond as a backer of a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced budget. Bond is using that issue in his Senate race against Lieutenant Governor Harriet Woods. In Sioux Falls, the president was careful *not* to mention tax reform, which had just cleared the Senate two days before. Republican strategists once considered tax reform a realigning issue, sure to attract new voters to the GOP. The problem was, Abdnor voted against it. Still, Reagan was brazen enough to extol Abdnor as a senator who's "stood up and said no to the interest groups who have full-time professionals in Washington."

THE TYPICAL Reagan tack this fall is to leap on some local issue that the Republican Senate candidate is promoting. To make sure they pick the right one, White House speechwriters now consult campaign officials. Also, campaign aides send recommended themes to Daniels. Tom Mason, Abdnor's administrative assistant, urged in a memo that Reagan play up Daschle's appearance at a Hollywood fund-raiser sponsored by Barbra Streisand. No sweat. "A few weeks ago, I was out in California," Reagan

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said in Sioux Falls, "and I couldn't help but notice that some of the chic group from the industry I used to be in there in Hollywood had gathered at one posh Malibu home to raise huge sums of money for 'left-leaning Senate candidates.' Well, Jim's opponent may be the choice of that flash-and-glitter crowd, but, come November, he's not going to be the choice of the people of South Dakota." The crowd went wild. They also burst into cheers when Reagan called Daschle a "razzle-dazzle liberal" and "one of those lighter-than-air liberals."

Not that Reagan ever referred to Daschle by name. He referred to him simply as "Jim's opponent." To mention Daschle by name might be seen as unpresidential. Or Reagan might be accused of personally attacking Daschle. "The comment can be just as telling with or without," said a White House official. "We'd hate to lose any of the effect because people read it as a personal attack rather than as fair comment on the opponent's record." So in Kansas City, Reagan attacked "Kit's opponent." The only Democrat he's mentioned so far is Senator Alan Cranston of California, and then just barely. In a speech at a September 7 fund-raiser for Representative Ed Zschau, the Republican challenger, Reagan threw bombs at "California's senior senator" and "Ed's opponent." Finally, he recalled that when he became president, the economy was "racked by double-digit inflation, sky-high interest rates, and business decline. You might say our economy had been Cranston-ized."

THE CLOSEST THING to a recurring theme in Reagan's speeches is an appeal to Democrats who voted for him in 1980 and 1984. Last summer, a brief pitch for them to vote for other Republicans was included in the text of stump speeches in Texas, Florida, and South Carolina. Reagan dutifully read those lines and ad-libbed a lot more. He said a study had been made "not too long ago" comparing the views of delegates to the two national conventions with the views of rank-and-file Republicans and Democrats. Actually, the study was conducted in 1972 by Jeane Kirkpatrick, then a little-known political science professor. Grass-roots Democrats, he said, were "way out of step with the leadership that has somehow gotten control of that once great party." Reagan neglected to cite the most self-serving finding—that rank-and-file Democrats agreed more with GOP leaders than with Democratic leaders. Now, a prolonged pitch for Democratic votes is part of every Reagan speech, though he stops short of advocating a national realignment. But several White House advisers want him to advocate just that later in the campaign.

Maybe he will, maybe he won't. Certainly the jokes will remain a staple. Reagan, the nation's Jokemaster General, draws from a collection of a dozen or so jokes for his campaign speeches. One, suggested to him by a speechwriter, is a version of a Myron Cohen joke about a rabbi and a priest whose cars had collided. "Presidents can't tell jokes about rabbis and priests," an aide says. So Reagan has substituted "a Yankee from up North" and a Southerner. In Montgomery, he said both got out of their cars after the wreck, "and with true Southern hospitality, the Southerner said to the Yankee, 'You look a little upset.' He offered the Yankee a drink from a liquor bottle, then another drink. Finally, the Yankee said, 'Wait a minute. I'm drinking all this myself. Here, don't you want a drink?' Nope, the Southerner said, 'I'll just stand here and wait until the police arrive.' "

FRED BARNES

THE MONEY CULTURE

STOCK MARKET QUIZ

GET OUT YOUR pencils for this week's Money Culture Stock Market Quiz. . . .

1. On September 29 Federal Express announced that it would end ZapMail, the electronic service that lets customers send letters anywhere in the country in a few hours. ZapMail has been a disaster for Federal Express; it's very expensive to run, and the company couldn't generate enough daily letters to cover overhead. Federal Express estimates that shutting down ZapMail will cost $340 million, mostly because it will have to sell its special facsimile equipment at a steep loss. The after-tax cost to the company will be $190 million, or about $3 per share of Fedex stock. The loss will cause a reduction of nearly 20 percent in the company's shareholders' equity, which is the best measure of its true value.

Now, the question: How did the stock market react to this horrendous news?

Wrong. Federal Express shot up 8 1/4 points, or more than 15 percent.

Why did the stock rise? Because the market is prospective. It is concerned only with the future—in fact, mainly with the far-out future. Investors already knew that ZapMail was hurting Federal Express. The company had lost $317 million on it in two years. So the damaging effects of continuing ZapMail were included in Fedex's stock price. When the announcement ending ZapMail came, investors didn't focus on the past or the present or even the near future (when the losses will actually be taken). They valued the ZapMail-less Federal Express of next year, and they decided it was worth ten percent more than the Federal Express of today.

This is a very simple lesson, and one that should be known to anyone who plays the market. But we forget. In the market, bad events can be good for a stock, and good events can be bad. It doesn't work that way in real life, where we tend to get mired in the present—if your house burns down, you don't say, "Well, I'm glad that's behind me"—so the confusion is only natural.

With that background, you're ready for the next question.

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2. Here are three explanations for the 120-point decline in the Dow Jones industrial average on September 11 and 12. Which one is correct?

(*a*) Congress returned from recess ready to pass the new tax bill with its elimination of deductions and its deep cuts in marginal rates. Now, however, faced with the new code, investors became nervous, extremely uncertain about its effect on the economy. The market hates uncertainty, so stocks plunged. (Conventional Wisdom.)

(*b*) "Congress returned from recess to discover that the tax bill isn't a done deal after all." Representatives spent a lot of time back home talking to real estate developers, who don't like the bill, and began balking. The market, which thinks that the new code will be a huge boon to the economy, freaked out at the prospect that the changes wouldn't be realized, and fell 120 points. (The *Wall Street Journal*.)

(*c*) Congress returned from recess certain to pass the new tax bill. For the past year or so, the benefits of the law were being built into the prices of stocks, since everyone knew what the benefits would be and since passage was fairly clear to the savvy observer. Now, on the eve of the vote, the market began to look to a farther horizon, beyond the salutary effects of the tax law. It couldn't find any other terrific developments, so it dropped sharply. (The Money Culture.)

Readers who want to impress the teacher will obviously answer "c." But none of these explanations is necessarily better than the others. No one can explain the action of the market as a whole on a particular day or week or month. The reason I've listed the three is to show that contradictory explanations of the same stock market phenomenon sound perfectly reasonable. (By the way, in this case, we do know that "b"—a theory posited in a *Wall Street Journal* editorial headlined "Tax-Balk Bears"—is seriously wrong, since the bill did pass and the market kept going down.)

Despite what Ben Stein tells his students in the movie *Ferris Bueller's Day Off*, we still haven't the foggiest notion why the market crashed in 1929. Sure, Ben, it might have been the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, but why wasn't protectionism discounted earlier? To say that the market was too optimistic about prosperity and pumped up too much by speculation is probably true, but why October 1929? Why not October 1928 or October 1930? The most sensible approach to market exegesis is put forward by Eugene Fama, a professor at the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago: "The market's basically not predictable, so I try not to predict it. My theory says there isn't any wisdom."

The problem with the Fama approach, of course, is that it isn't any fun. The market's ups and downs beg for explanation. And I've noticed lately that some of my more intellectual friends think that they can explain it, the way they can explain Soviet nuclear strategy. Look at me. I certainly know better, and yet I've added my own fix on September 11-12 to the pot.

If I could stick to agnosticism, I would end this piece right here, but obviously I can't. Where's the market going? All right, I'll answer. But first, the third question in our quiz:

3. Many analysts say that the market was driven down on September 11-12 by "program trading." This is a system used by big institutional investors who unleash their computers to take advantage of little gaps and inconsistencies in the market—in other words, arbitrage. They spend huge amounts of money in a very short time buying and selling. Mostly, they exploit the difference between the price of the actual stocks that make up the baskets of stocks used in stock market index futures contracts and the price of those contracts themselves. The action becomes especially hot just when the futures contracts are about to expire. So much money is spent so quickly that huge swings in prices occur. A corollary of this theory is that the large swings are only temporary. In other words, the program traders may overshoot their marks by 20 or 30 points on the downside on Tuesday, but a week or so later, the market has gained those points back. Still, most observers see program trading as scary and dislocating. It chases away smaller investors and can destroy efficient markets.

THE QUESTION: Is program trading really a new and disruptive force in the market? To put it as *Business Week* did: Is it true that "the people who make these markets go are not the pin-striped potentates of Wall Street, but the feisty daredevils who scream their lungs out on the floor of the [Chicago futures and options] exchanges"?

The correct answer is: Baloney. The market can compensate in advance for anything it knows is going to happen. If the market knew today that interest rates would fall tomorrow, then the market would rise today, not tomorrow. Thus, if investors know that program traders will overshoot their mark in the near future, why don't those investors take advantage of that overshooting before it happens? If it's obvious, based on the relationship between underlying stocks and index futures, that the market is going to become wildly oversold, then why shouldn't investors overbuy to make up for the correction before it happens?

Sure, it's possible that the market hasn't quite caught on to program trading yet, but to dismiss the declines of June 9 (46 points), July 6 (62 points), and September 11 (87 points) as merely the result of the vagaries of a new trading system is to miss the point entirely.

And the point? It's the same one that The Money Culture made on April 7: all signs point to a market that is ridiculously bloated. Stocks are still trading at very high multiples of earnings, new mutual funds continue to glut the market (there are 1,040 bond and equity funds today,

WE GET CONFUSED

Market slide seen as short-term trend

—*USA Today*, September 15, page B-1

Analysts see market rout returning

—*USA Today*, September 15, page B-3

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compared with 460 five years ago), and the public remains blissed out, dreamily optimistic. A *Business Week*/Harris poll, taken just after the mid-September plunge, reported that Americans who think the market will be higher by the end of the year outnumber doubters 3-to-1.

To play the stock market successfully, you have to find bargains in individual stocks. If you find something that's been overlooked and undervalued by investors, then buy it. The problem is that, in a time like this, there aren't many bargains, only a lot of explanations.

JAMES K. GLASSMAN

The real 'city on a hill.'

WINTHROP V. REAGAN

FOR SIX YEARS President Reagan has repeatedly dragged out the trope of the "shining city on a hill" to celebrate the miracle his administration has worked for America and the world. He used it in his bombastic remarks at the Statue of Liberty celebrations on July 4:

> I've spoken before of the tiny *Arabella*, a ship at anchor just off the Massachusetts coast. A little group of Puritans huddled on the deck. And then John Winthrop, who would later become the first Governor of Massachusetts, reminded his fellow Puritans there on that tiny deck that they must keep faith with their God, that the eyes of all the world were upon them, and that they must not forsake the mission that God had sent them on, and they must be a light unto the nations of all the world—a shining city upon a hill.

Reagan's imaginative approach to facts has long been seen as one of his peculiar charms. Thus no one thought twice when he got the name of the ship wrong (it was the *Arbella*, not the *Arabella*), and no one's bothered to correct him for using the word "shining," which does not appear in the original. Still, the president shouldn't get away with his misinterpretation of one of the earliest and most powerful visions of the American community.

Winthrop's sermon, entitled "A Model of Christian Charity," is a detailed and complex analysis of theological questions that had bearing on the Puritan errand into the wilderness of the New World. Like most newcomers, the Puritans hoped for economic success in their colony. It was, after all, at least in part a commercial venture by the Massachusetts Bay Company. Knowing that his people would meet disappointments and that the poor would always be among them, Winthrop sought to prepare his flock for mixed times ahead. "God Almighty in his most holy and wise providence," he declared, "hath so disposed of the condition of mankind, as in all times some must be rich, some poor, some high and eminent in power, and dignity, others mean and in subjection."

Winthrop's premise sounds like a cross between predestination and social Darwinism—themes appropriate enough for Reagan. But his response to the inequities of life in a free enterprise society is hardly one that Reagan has championed. At the end of the sermon, in the very passage that the president cited on the Fourth of July, Winthrop reminded his people that they had a covenant to build a full community based on the best of their Judeo-Christian heritage. He went on to outline what sounds like a Puritan New Deal. "We must be knit together in this work as one man," he proclaimed. "We must entertain each other in brotherly affection, we must be willing to abridge ourselves of our superfluities, for the supply of others' necessities." In a crescendo that any White House speechwriter would envy, he said: "We must delight in each other, make others' conditions our own, rejoice together, mourn together, labor and suffer together, always having before our eyes our commission and community in the work, our community as members of the same body."

WINTHROP DECIDEDLY did not say that the new settlers must—as Reagan puts it, "be a light unto the nations of the world—a shining city upon a hill." He said that if the members of the new community upheld their covenant with God and with each other, even in the times of greatest adversity, then God would bless them and make them powerful. If they did not live up to their ideals, they would not deserve emulation. "For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill," said Winthrop, ". . . so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause him to withdraw his present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world. . . . [W]e shall surely perish out of the good land whither we pass over this vast sea to possess it."

Winthrop took the "city on a hill" phrase from the Sermon on the Mount, where Christ—another oft-abused source of Reagan quotations—warned that even the salt of the earth could be cast out and trodden upon. In praising the virtues of poverty and peacefulness, Christ said that "a city that is set upon a hill cannot be hid." Reagan brags about success. Christ and Winthrop preached humility and communal responsibility.

As William Bennett and Ed Meese constantly stress, it is important to immerse ourselves in American history. By going back to our roots, to the original principles of our Founders, we will renew ourselves as a nation. This exercise reveals the critical difference between Reagan's vision and Winthrop's. Reagan says that if we grow rich and powerful, we will become a glorious city to which the world will look in admiration. Winthrop declared that, like it or not, we already are up there, our failures as visible as our successes.

PAUL D. ERICKSON

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The sorry record of sanctions.

BOOSTERS AND BUSTERS

"WHAT WE NEED NOW," announced the Afrikaans-language newspaper *Beeld* in reaction to the latest round of European sanctions against South Africa, "is a new, courageous generation of sanctions busters." Indeed, Western enthusiasm for economic sanctions has not been stronger since the world teamed up against Rhodesia in 1965. The Senate will almost certainly override the presidential veto of the sanctions bill that was passed overwhelmingly by both houses, and the European Economic Community recently adopted a sanctions package of its own. The dreary truth, though, is that the newest round of sanctions will likely prove to be only a minor inconvenience to Pretoria. And it's likely that those nations now clamoring the loudest for sanctions will be among the first to ignore them.

Contrary to Donald Regan's predictions, the populist surge of opposition to South African sanctions by diamond-addicted American matrons failed to materialize. Sanctions-supporting India, on the other hand, has found its own diamond habit hard to break. At the recent Commonwealth summit conference in London and at the meeting of non-aligned nations in Zimbabwe, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi pressed insistently for international sanctions. In London he went so far as to advocate that the Commonwealth Secretariat set up an enforcement unit to monitor and publicize governments that skirt the *cordon sanitaire*. "If India is busting sanctions, let India be exposed," he declared. If such an enforcement agency were created (an unlikely event, as the suggestion was dropped immediately by the Commonwealth leaders), one of its most obvious targets would be India.

Since 1954 India has officially banned trade with South Africa, but merchants from Bombay and Cochin have proved adept at evading the ban, shipping grain and spices through third nations such as Singapore, Seychelles, or Mauritius to disguise the final destination. Following exposés in the local press, the Indian government arrested eight businessmen in July who admitted to sanctions busting. (They have since been released.) Businessmen can always be relied upon to dodge sanctions if they are well rewarded for it, but in India the merchants were merely following the government's lead.

India is the world's largest processor of diamonds. The industry employs a half million artisans, who cut and polish the gems. The finished diamonds are the country's single largest export. Reports that many of these stones come from South African mines first surfaced in *India Today* magazine in December and filtered back to the West just as Gandhi was ascending the podium in Harare to denounce Western nations for refusing to toughen their stance against apartheid. In a subsequent interview with the *Washington Post*, Gandhi denied dealing in apartheid ice, pointing out that South Africa produces large diamonds, whereas India processes small ones. "Statistically, we would not be getting South African diamonds," he claimed.

"Statistically," about six percent of the $600 million worth of rough diamonds that India imports originate in South Africa. But this number is almost irrelevant, since more than one-third of India's ice is purchased through the Diamond Trading Corporation, a London branch of the South African diamond company De Beers. Like the other nations involved in the diamond trade, India is an arm of the worldwide system of market control that is orchestrated by De Beers, and the profits it reaps depend on De Beers's monopoly control. (The *Economist* suggested that the most effective sanction of all would be to prosecute those nationals who collaborate with the De Beers diamond network.) India's Hindustan Diamond Company Ltd., which imports most of the gems, is 50 percent owned by the government. The other half is split between something called the Indian Investment Trust and the Bank of Bermuda, both of which are fronts for De Beers, according to *India Today*. Further, the boom in Indian diamond processing would never have occurred had it not been for De Beers's campaign to "democratize" diamonds to the point where a small stone is as essential to marriage as the vows.

OF COURSE INDIA is hardly alone when it comes to sanctions duplicity. The U.N. ban on arms sales to South Africa, which was first instituted in 1963 after the Sharpeville massacre and was strengthened in 1977, has a venerable history of evasion. France, which along with Denmark has become a vociferous supporter of stronger EEC sanctions, continued through the late 1970s to provide the South African Defense Force with Alouette helicopters, Daphne-class submarines, surface-to-air missiles, and missile patrol boats. When international pressure forced France to cease selling its F3 Mirage jet fighter to the South African air force, the French provided the expertise to allow them to produce it domestically, using components shipped through Israel. In September a Danish shipowner was sentenced for smuggling 1,800 tons of cannon and ammunition from Bordeaux to Durban via Argentina. The weapons had been supplied by France's government-owned arms company OFEMA.

Although South Africa's imports from Eastern bloc countries is a negligible $13 million, there is evidence suggesting that at least some of that is being spent on arms. Czech rifles and Bulgarian shotguns have turned up in South Africa, and in 1982 a Danish court sentenced another Danish shipowner for transporting rifles and machine guns produced in Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Since the shipping documents were falsified, it is uncertain whether the Eastern bloc governments were complicit in the deal, but all refused to prosecute the case.

One way for countries to continue to reap the profits of apartheid while appearing to take a moral stance is to license South African-owned firms to produce and distribute goods for them. Japan has long been an avid player of the licensing game, which has allowed it to expand its share of the South

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African market despite a government ban on direct investment by Japanese firms. Since 1982 Japan has managed to dominate the South African car market and to double its computer exports, despite a ban on sales to security forces imposed last October. Coca-Cola has used the same ploy in its recent disinvestment scheme. Afrikaners will still be able to enjoy an icy Coke. The only difference is that it will be bottled and distributed by a locally owned firm.

NOT SURPRISINGLY, the record of compliance with sanctions is even spottier among the countries that have opposed them. Whether because of some recidivist empathy, or for purely economic reasons, West Germany has recently displaced Thatcher as Europe's bulwark against sanctions and as Pretoria's biggest trading partner. Its exports to South Africa in 1985 were $1.69 billion. When asked to justify its position, a spokesman for the Kohl government cited the Allied blockade of the Nazis during World War II as proof that sanctions could not work. To back up this claim, he might have told how German armament firms have provided the components and technology for South Africa's latest models of mobile artillery, missiles, and communications systems.

Even when a state makes a good-faith effort to enforce the arms ban, as the United States did under the Carter administration, private enterprise and third countries provide a ready conduit for illicit trade. In some instances American firms have circumvented the arms embargo, as in the notorious case of the Space Research Corporation, which (with the aid of the CIA) sold South Africa G-5 howitzers capable of firing nuclear shells.

In order to reap economies of scale in the weapons that it produces at home, South Africa has begun marketing arms abroad as well. South Africa even participated in international arms shows in Greece in 1982 and Chile in 1984. Among the wares displayed in Athens were copies of the G-5 howitzer, which had been pirated from the United States and were reportedly purchased by Iraq.

ARMSCOR, South Africa's state-owned arms conglomerate, has found numerous willing go-betweens to run the nominal arms blockade. In the 1970s Italy furnished the South Africans with American-made Huey helicopters and Lockheed planes, in addition to domestic-brand missiles. Singapore, Israel, and South Korea are also reported to be active arms brokers for South Africa. In 1979 India served as a conduit for 60 British Centurion tanks, which were shipped to Durban via Spain. With the Reagan administration planning to provide Stinger missiles to UNITA, South Africa's proxy in Angola, it is more than likely that this technology will fall into ARMSCOR's hands as well. In 1980, 17 years after arms sanctions were first imposed and after an intensive effort by South Africa to develop the local arms industry, the chairman of ARMSCOR admitted that a quarter of the country's armament budget was spent abroad.

The type of high-technology systems and heavy weaponry that South Africa is forced to buy abroad are manufactured by only a few of the largest, most developed nations in the world, and by a very small number of firms within those countries, all of which are subject to intense government scrutiny. According to all economic logic, it is precisely this sort of oligopolistic market structure that should make for successful sanctions. If these measures have been effectively dodged by Pretoria, what is the likelihood of enforcing the more wide-ranging bans on computer technology, food, textiles, steel, and coal currently being considered by the United States and the EEC?

If history is to be believed, very little. In addition to routinely falsifying trade documents, Pretoria has proved willing to conceal its trade with nations for whom commerce with apartheid would be a political embarrassment. The unspecified "Other Countries" category in South Africa's trade statistics has now swollen to nearly a third of the total. When the Organization for African Unity imposed its blanket sanctions in 1963, Ghana, Nigeria, and the Ivory Coast merely stopped reporting their trade with South Africa. By 1985 South Africa exported $1.4 billion to the rest of the continent. However, at South Africa's request, the IMF does not publish the identities of the countries involved. "Politically this is a very sensitive issue," confided an IMF official. "Many of these countries could not survive without South Africa as a source of supply, but it is too embarrassing for them to admit that." Another spectacular failure was OPEC's oil embargo, which either through willful neglect or lack of technical means has never been regularly enforced. (See "Apartheid's Oil," TNR, February 10, 1986.)

For those countries that are willing to continue trading with South Africa—including Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan—Western sanctions could prove to be an economic bonanza. South Korea publishes no record of its trade with South Africa in order to preserve its relation with black African nations, and Pretoria recently moved Korea into the "Other Countries" category in anticipation of growing pressures on its Asian friend. Any attempt to shut off the flow of cash needed to finance these third-country deals is unlikely to succeed. South Africa's largest source of foreign exchange is gold, 90 percent of which is marketed through Switzerland, a nation that has historically refused to engage in sanctions of any sort.

Ironically, the so-called "front-line" states of Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique will make up the most significant group of South African collaborators. Already Europe has seen a surge in "Swazi" oranges as European consumers have developed a dislike for the fruits of apartheid. (The oranges actually come from South Africa, but are repackaged.) Despite Robert Mugabe's best intentions, Zimbabwe, which relies on South African rails and highways to transship 60 percent of its trade, is also likely to become increasingly complicit in South African sanctions busting. Because 80 percent of all railway traffic in Africa passes through the South African rail network, it is nearly impossible to choke off Pretoria without strangling the continent.

In the rush of enthusiasm for sanctions, it is often forgotten that this stick has been brandished at South Africa before. The regime has in fact become remarkably adept at deflecting the blow, thanks in large part to the quiet cooperation it has received from other countries. Given the

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stubbornness of the Afrikaners and the hypocrisy of their critics, sanctions will mean higher transaction and shipping costs for South Africa, heavy losses for the countries that impose them, and a financial killing for those countries with more business sense than scruples.

CROCKER COULSON

The Anglo-Irish accord under siege.

WAR IN PEACE

SUMMER CAME EARLY this year in Ulster. The annual marching season, when Protestant and Catholic communities parade through the streets of Ulster honoring sectarian anniversaries, began in earnest a couple of months sooner than usual. On Easter Monday, the day after Christians traditionally celebrate the Resurrection, Unionist marchers sent 70 people, including 40 policemen, to the hospital. The violence has not let up since. This spring as compared to last, there was a quadrupling of serious injuries among non-civilians, and a doubling among civilians. The Protestant paramilitary groups, which had been dormant for several years, have re-emerged, and the Irish Republican Army has launched a brutal new campaign. The reason for the renewed outburst of civil war? A peace agreement.

The Anglo-Irish accord, signed last November in Hillsborough, Ulster, by Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Garret FitzGerald, appeared to be a model of astute diplomacy. The Irish Republic formally recognized the right of the Northern province to remain within the United Kingdom for as long as a majority of its citizens wanted it. In return, Britain was to allow the Republic to have a consultative and deliberative role in the affairs of the province through something called an Intergovernmental Conference. The logic was that by allowing the South to voice the concerns of the minority Catholic community in the North, Catholics would be less likely to support extremist politics. Meanwhile, the Republic's formal recognition of partition, lodged at the U.N., would reassure the Protestant majority of their security within Britain. It seemed a perfect match.

And on two levels, at least, the accord has had the desired effect. First, the agreement proved to all but the most uncompromising Irish-Americans that Britain is earnest about the plight of Northern Catholics. The British, of course, had been struggling with power-sharing initiatives, rolling devolution schemes, and the like for over a decade. But none had quite the public relations punch of a full-scale treaty between two powers that also managed to circumvent the slow, dispiriting wrangle between the fractious communities in Ulster. The result, according to the British security forces, has been a marked drop in private American funding for IRA arms. (There's also been an apparent decline in its professionalism. In April a cache of arms from Chicago burst open in a Dublin post office. There's some hope, it seems, when terrorists are reduced to sending weapons by mail.)

Second, the strategy to undercut Catholic support for extremist political options seems to be working. Sinn Fein, the political voice of the IRA, suffered a sharp drop in support in the by-elections called last January by the incumbent Unionist members of Parliament to protest the agreement. The more moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party, meanwhile, nearly doubled its support from the previous election. Most Ulster papers saw the rise in support for the SDLP as the major outcome of the vote.

Nevertheless, recent developments in both the South and the North have not been encouraging. In the Republic, the pact has been knocked sideways by FitzGerald's increasing political vulnerability. His constituents, a wide majority of whom initially endorsed the agreement, increasingly see it as a one-way street of concessions. Abandoning traditional claims to the Northern province and agreeing to support the British security forces have produced almost nothing tangible in return. Thanks to the Protestant hostility to the pact, the British have been unable to provide any breakthroughs for the Northern Catholics without provoking yet another upswing in violence from the Unionists. They're now boxed into a corner of nervous inaction.

The paradox in all this is striking. The accord has actually made any real cooperation on security matters more, not less, politically embarrassing for the FitzGerald administration. It may also prove the last straw for the most cooperative Irish leader the British have dealt with in years. Already humiliated by the rebuff he received in the summer's referendum on divorce, FitzGerald is now expected to lose a general election likely to occur next year or even earlier. Charles Haughey, the probable victor, has played the anti-Hillsborough card for all it's worth.

IN THE PROVINCE, the rising level of street violence is also intensifying the strain. The IRA's response to Sinn Fein's election defeats has been to crank up the terror. Earlier this year, they extended their habitual threats against the livelihoods of "collaborators," promising to liquidate any workers who were engaged in contracts with the British authorities. Since some 44 percent of the labor force in Ulster is employed by the government, the threat is chillingly comprehensive. In July a worker supplying cement and stone for the construction of a police station was shot dead by a gunman in an Omagh pub. That sort of civilian terror has caused the loss of over 1,000 jobs and the suspension of several multimillion-dollar construction projects in a province with an unemployment rate nudging 40 percent in certain areas.

But the major blow to the agreement has come from the vehemence of the Unionist opposition to it. Polls in Northern Ireland show 85 percent of Unionists strongly critical of the deal. Far from reassuring them of the tie with Britain, it has killed any trust that lingered between Belfast and London. Instead of providing a forum for a moderate Unionist revival, it has revived the worst paranoiac prejudice of the

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Unionist mind. Even the imperturbable Thatcher, a long-time Unionist sympathizer, has been visibly shaken by the reaction. She has become that ultimate figure of hatred in the long history of Irish animosity: an apostate. Walls in Belfast carry the message: "Thatcher is a liar. Thatcher is a traitor." Her apparent defection from the Protestant cause is seen as an inexplicable and unforgivable reward for the IRA terrorists who came close to murdering her less than two years ago.

The Unionists' anger is intensified by what they regard as the universal British and Irish contempt for their view of the Irish problem. As they see it, their case is never heard outside the province—their predicament always eclipsed by the more dramatic (and more acute) plight of the Catholic minority. They have been in Ireland as long as many Britons have lived on the mainland, as long as the majority of inhabitants of the Irish Republic, and considerably longer than almost all Irish-Americans in the United States. They have never been anything but British subjects, and yet feel constantly threatened with the removal of the government and identity they prefer. If accused of being extremist, they ask how English or American citizens would react if they were informed that, without being consulted, they were soon to become citizens of France or Mexico. They look with amazement at a country that will risk its entire navy to defend islands in the South Atlantic and yet seems indifferent to fellow citizens only 30 miles from the mainland. (A poll in May revealed that 61 percent of mainland Britons see Northern Ireland's future as lying outside the United Kingdom.) The British stereotype of the average Ulsterman is of a bowler-hatted man, frothing at the mouth and consumed with 17th-century bigotry. To many Britons he is less appealing than the average Afrikaner—and just as alien.

THE REAL PICTURE of Ulster Unionism bears little resemblance to these stereotypes. Northern Ireland has the lowest crime rate—excluding terrorism—in the United Kingdom and the best industrial relations. From 1984 to 1986, the mainland recorded more than twice the number of working days lost through strikes. In its close-knit, devout communities, Ulster also has the lowest level of illegitimate births in the United Kingdom. Inevitably the solid mass of prosperous, middle-class Unionists feel wounded by the prejudice that lumps them all in the same extremist, irresponsible mass.

Nor are Ulster's sectarian conflicts unique. Any spectator at a Glasgow Celtics v. Rangers soccer match will see the Protestant-Catholic divide as sharply as anywhere in Belfast or Londonderry. What makes Ulster different is that the conflicts are fatally mixed with a territorial dispute that makes sovereignty the first political question. This has led to an essential disenfranchisement of the population: none of the national British political parties—Tory, Labour, or Alliance—contest elections in Ulster, where the choice is a variant of Unionist or Republican. And this political isolation is combined with a level of terrorist violence that makes any civilized achievement seem all the more remarkable. In 1985, the most peaceful of recent years, there were some 54 terrorist deaths and 900 injuries among a population half that of Connecticut. Under this sort of siege, many Ulstermen regard as treachery anything that could be interpreted as a concession to the terrorists. And that's how they see the new accord.

Whether this is irrational or bigoted is largely beside the point. What it effectively means is that the slightest practical initiative by the British government to improve the job prospects or civil rights of the Catholic minority will be harder to enforce with the pact than without it. Every government action to help the Catholic minority is now interpreted by the Ulstermen as a diktat from Dublin. Since November any consensus on judicial reform, cultural initiatives, or employment measures has become progressively more distant. What might have been quietly conceded a year ago, even renaming a street in Gaelic, has now become an explosive issue. If changes are to come, they will require the full weight of British military and security forces. To create a lasting peace, they will have to fight an increasingly bitter war against the very people the accord was supposed to pacify.

THERE ARE SIGNS that the British and Irish governments are beginning to realize this. Tom King, British secretary of state for Northern Ireland, and Margaret Thatcher have made new overtures to the dangerously alienated Protestant community. The real worry is that although the agreement may have undercut radicalism among the minority, it has severely increased its appeal among the majority. New leaders, such as Peter Robinson, who manages to make the Rev. Ian Paisley seem moderate, have emerged to take over the Unionist leadership.

James Molyneaux, the leader of the mainstream Official Ulster Unionist Party, concedes that his supporters are now prepared to tolerate the activities of Protestant paramilitaries in a way that leaves him and other more responsible spokesmen stranded. The Protestant population has both withdrawn from all forms of local government and acquiesced in a vicious campaign against the police who enforce the agreement. In the spring, Protestant paramilitaries began a firebombing campaign against the homes of Protestant policemen accused of complicity with the hated government in Dublin. By the end of March alone, there had been 346 attacks on members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, their families, and their homes. Fifty-eight families had to be rehoused.

There is, of course, a possibility that the worst will not happen. One scenario, written into the pact, is that the Unionists will agree to a devolved, power-sharing arrangement designed to replace the Intergovernmental Conference step by step. But this would require both a revival of moderate Unionist leadership, which the accord has undermined, and a temporary acceptance of the conference while devolution got underway. A leading moderate Unionist recently ruled out this last possibility. His demand—a suspension of the agreement by the British—would lead to a wrecking of the Anglo-Irish

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trust so carefully built up over the last few years.

All of this points to what is becoming an unspoken anxiety on both sides of the Irish Sea. It's the fear that, thanks to a peace agreement too entrenched to dismantle, Ulster Loyalists will soon be loyal to no one. By attempting a rushed breakthrough for "peace," Thatcher and FitzGerald have made any future reconciliation among the communities in Ulster more unlikely than ever. And if the pact is maintained, armed repression of the Ulstermen may soon become the only option. It will not be a peaceful one. As a Unionist rioter put it in April, "We are not like the miners or the Argies. We are unbreakable." Whether Ulster's final solution is also Ulster's final catastrophe will largely depend on whether he was right.

ANDREW SULLIVAN

Andrew Sullivan is a a former TNR reporter-researcher.

A pale imitation of Reagan.

THE DEMOCRATS' 'YES, BUT' FOREIGN POLICY

BY MORTON KONDRACKE

LIKE AN ALCOHOLIC who vows every morning to quit drinking but is back with the bottle by nightfall, the Democratic Party responds to its shellackings in presidential elections by solemnly resolving to move to the center, especially on foreign policy. Its pragmatic new national chairman appoints an issues panel composed of elected officials from around the country—because they are "closer to the people" than Washington interest group representatives and think-tankers—and this group produces a midterm document that wins a *New York Times* headline such as "Democrats Etch a Centrist Image in Policy Report."

That was, in fact, the front-page headline on September 21 that heralded this year's effort, "New Choices in a Changing America," produced by a 100-member Democratic Policy Commission formed by national chairman Paul Kirk. Though a political adviser to Senator Edward Kennedy for many years, Kirk is no lefty. He personally favors aid to the Nicaraguan *contras* and is determined—much as chairmen Robert Strauss and Charles Manatt were before him—to make the Democratic Party attractive to moderate voters, especially in the South and West.

To head the policy commission, Kirk picked former Utah governor Scott Matheson, who chose as executive director a rotund 47-year-old former professor of national security policy at Ohio State and the University of Colorado, Philip M. Burgess. Burgess contends that "the Democratic Party is in bad shape with the American people on foreign policy; they think we're weak and ineffectual, that we always blame America first." Burgess is especially irritated at Democratic foreign policy documents packed with what he calls the "yes, but" construction—"You know, 'there is a serious Soviet threat, *but* we have to give away more on arms control.' No one ever seems to be able to just say, 'The Soviets are our greatest threat.' "

The policy commission report says not once, but twice, that "the Soviet Union poses the greatest threat to world peace and freedom," and adds: "Democrats harbor no illusions about the Soviet Union. Theirs is a totalitarian society that remains an empire in the classic sense." To maintain America's security requires "foremost, military strength . . . constant vigilance and a strong conventional and nuclear arsenal." It continues, "Although we hope armed conflict is not required to defend peace and preserve freedom, we will use our military power if it becomes necessary." For perhaps the first time in recent history, the party here declares itself in favor of some nuclear weapons systems (the Midgetman missile, Trident submarine, D-5 missile, and stealth bomber) without specifically opposing any. It supports Star Wars research, though not testing or deployment.

The report criticizes President Reagan's defense buildup—not because it was unjustified by Soviet conduct, but because it was "unguided by strategy or policy." It expresses concern that "divisions within the administration" might torpedo chances for arms control. The report supports "tough, effective new sanctions" against South Africa's "racist" regime, and says Reagan's policies have been too little too late. It also acknowledges that fostering evolution toward majority rule is "complicated" and is threatened by "extremism on both the right and the left." It blames starvation in Ethiopia squarely on the Marxist-Leninist regime, and accuses the Russians of brutality in Afghanistan and of spreading totalitarianism in Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia.

It's no accident that the report is tough on the Soviets, positive about defense, and in places eloquent and courageous in trying to lead the party toward realistic positions on controversial issues. The foreign policy section was drafted under the supervision of Representative Les Aspin of Wisconsin, who has so infuriated party liberals by voting in favor of the MX missile and aid to the *contras* that they

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have plotted to have him removed as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. The actual writing was done by Jay Winik, a 29-year-old member of Aspin's staff who formerly was executive director of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), a group of neoconservative disciples of the late Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington.

Even under Aspin and Winik, the Democratic document is not entirely free of "yes, but" argumentation. For example, it acknowledges that arms control can't resolve the "deep, ideological, and enduring" U.S.-Soviet conflict, admits that the SALT II and ABM treaties were "not perfect," and accuses the Soviets of cheating on arms control agreements, of walking out of the Geneva talks, and of engaging in "posturing and polemics" instead of negotiating. But it urges continued compliance with existing treaties and negotiation of new ones, arguing (justifiably) that they can limit Soviet weapons development and test the sincerity of the new generation of Soviet leadership.

THIS SEEMS a less egregious example of "yes, but" reasoning than those found in other Democratic documents, where heavy rhetoric is packed in front of "but" to mask the policy capitulation that follows. Refreshingly, there are even cases when the position after "but" is *stronger* than the rhetoric before, as in "it is wrong to mistake a political conflict for a purely military one. . . . But it is equally wrong not to recognize that many political conflicts have a sizable military dimension where one side, often backed by radical forces supported by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and others, will defeat fledgling or even mature democratic elements unless they are provided countervailing assistance in the form of diplomatic pressure, economic aid and, if necessary, military assistance." To comply with Kirk's orders that the commission try for consensus among Democrats and avoid intraparty warfare, the report takes no position on aid to El Salvador, to the *contras*, or to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. It does say that "when the opponents of liberty are backed by foreign military aid and driven by radical ideology, negotiations and economic assistance alone are often insufficient."

The Aspin-Winik draft got into print with surprisingly little controversy. The only major objections were raised by Atlanta mayor Andrew Young, formerly Jimmy Carter's United Nations ambassador, who flew up to Washington for three days to protest its tendency to blame Third World conflicts on communism rather than on poverty, injustice, and colonialism. Young reportedly was also angered by an acknowledgment of charges that U.S. human rights pressure may have fueled anti-American revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua. The reference remained in the final version.

This document—like other midterm manifestos of the past—may merit and receive the label "centrist," but it only counts in the long run if it represents the real center of gravity of the Democratic Party and is sustained by Democrats in Congress and by potential presidential nominees. Unfortunately, the Democratic pattern is for midterm to be the high point of ideological moderation, the "yes" before the "but." Once the presidential primary season starts, candidates increasingly begin to vie with each other to pass liberal litmus tests such as the immediate withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972, the cancellation of the MX missile in 1980, and the nuclear freeze in 1984. There is plenty of reason to fear that by 1988 the party will be once again open to Republican charges of weakness and neo-isolationism.

ONE INDICATION comes in the form of a semi-suppressed report by a foreign policy task force of the Democratic Policy Commission. Headed by Representative Stephen Solarz of New York, the task force officially reported to Aspin, but only its formulation of eight principles guiding foreign policy made it into the final document. The principles are entirely in keeping with the moderate character of the commission report. However, the Solarz report—and, even more so, a paper trail of seven task force drafts—indicates that the true foreign policy soul of the party is considerably to the left of Les Aspin's and Paul Kirk's.

The Solarz report was drafted by one of the party's great rhetoricians, John Kennedy speechwriter Ted Sorensen, with assistance from Washington lawyers Harry McPherson and Peter Rosenblatt. The latter, president of CDM, objected strongly to the consistently dovish tone of Sorensen's basic work, and his views were incorporated as hawkish rhetoric. The result is vintage "yes, but" foreign policy: "We do not favor agreement for the sake of agreement. An accord founded on illusion, ignorance, or false or foolish hopes certainly does not serve our interests. If that is the only basis on which agreement can be had, it would be far better that there be no accord. But merely denouncing Soviet aggression or repression is no substitute for a realistic strategy for dealing with it."

The Solarz report lends support to six specific arms control treaties—including ABM, SALT, and a comprehensive test ban—but mentions not a single weapons system. By design, it is also a far more polemical anti-Reagan document than the Aspin report. It accuses the administration of failing to achieve any arms agreements because "a hard core of right-wing ideologues" has conducted a policy "characterized more by intransigence than initiative." (One Sorensen draft accused the administration of mounting no arms control initiatives whatsoever.) In Southern Africa, it asserts, Reagan has "steadfastly backed the wrong side of history," and in Central America, the administration "at times appears to be setting the stage" for the dispatch of U.S. Marines. (One draft declared, "The American people do not want another Cuba in Latin America. But neither do they want another Vietnam.")

Early drafts of the Solarz report used more than a dozen congressional votes to demonstrate where Democrats and Republicans stand on various key issues. The list was pulled from the final version when Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland pleaded on behalf of the entire Senate Democratic caucus that it would provide ammunition for Republicans in the 1986 elections. Solarz acceded to Sarbanes's request, but told me he believes the votes actually are an advantage to the Democrats. "The public is with us," he said, "and they are in the best interests of the country."

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Solarz has considerable polling data to back up his claim—especially on aid to the *contras* and support for SALT—though a majority of voters supports Reagan's overall handling of foreign policy. According to public opinion analyst William Schneider, "People don't like Reagan's rhetoric, but they find his actual policies reassuring for the same reason that conservatives are furious about them—they're pretty cautious. The public still views the Democrats as the party of national weakness."

Here are some of the suppressed tallies. In 1983, 73 percent of Senate Democrats and 84 percent of House Democrats supported a nuclear freeze. In 1984, 83 percent of Senate Democrats opposed full funding of Star Wars. In 1983, 70 percent of Senate Democrats opposed the manufacture of chemical weapons. In 1985, 75 percent of House Democrats opposed repeal of the Clark Amendment banning covert aid in Angola. In 1983 and 1984, House and Senate Democrats voted three times by margins of more than 75 percent to prohibit aid to the *contras*. In 1984, 78 percent of House Democrats opposed expanded military aid to El Salvador. The votes also show that this year Democrats overwhelmingly opposed increasing military aid to Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, while Republicans favored it; and that 75 percent of House Democrats urged Chile's government to negotiate with its democratic opposition, while 87 percent of Republicans voted no.

ACCORDING TO Solarz, these votes are not entirely representative of Democratic foreign policy. They don't show where Democrats and Republicans agree—as on support for Israel and rebels fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. Nor does his report show that Democratic pressure has succeeded in pushing the Reagan administration to adjust its policies, especially on arms control, the Philippines, and El Salvador. "This is a partisan document," he said. "It's meant to help candidates win elections." Kirk, for one, plainly did not think it would help, and asked Solarz to cancel a planned press conference to release his report. He held an "informal press briefing" instead. Solarz also wanted his panel to be a permanent party policy panel, but Burgess and Kirk ruled that the policy commission and all of its subgroups were going out of business when their final report was issued.

Solarz says that even though most of the public objections to his report came from conservatives, the party's left wing actually has more to complain of, "and numerically, the left is more significant than the right in this party." No representative from Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition was represented either on Solarz's task force or Aspin's committee. Kirk claims he asked Howard University professor Ronald Walters, Jackson's issues coordinator, to send in papers for consideration. Walters says he heard from no one.

If the presidential primary pattern of 1984 is repeated in 1988, Jackson will exercise a powerful leftward pull on Democratic debate and can use a threat to leave the party as a lever to make himself heeded. Among potential 1988 candidates, he has the clearest of all foreign policies, with few "yes, buts" necessary. He wants to cut radically the defense budget to provide jobs and training to the poor. Where there are perceived threats to U.S. security, he counsels negotiation—or alignment—with the adversary.

Slowly, the rest of the 1988 Democratic field is beginning to formulate its foreign policy. The most serious attempt yet has been three lengthy lectures by Senator Gary Hart, urging that "enlightened engagement" replace isolationism or containment as guiding American doctrine. Hart's policy resembles nothing so much as that advanced by Jimmy Carter in the early stages of his presidency. Hart argues that "changing power realities"—exemplified by Vietnam—means that the United States cannot intervene as effectively as it did after World War II. As in Carter's rejection of "any inordinate fear of communism," Hart declares that "the strictly bipolar world is gone" and "it is only in the military field that the Soviet Union is a serious competitor." Carter ultimately underwent an embarrassing public conversion about the Soviets when they used their military power in Afghanistan.

Hart makes a compelling argument for using America's economic, intellectual, and moral strengths more effectively in conducting policy, but he remains as reluctant to use military power as he was in 1984, when he attempted to write into the Democratic platform a gauntlet of seven tests that any intervention would have to pass before being approved, including meeting a vital U.S. security interest, having public support, and being "achievable in its execution." Hart opposed the Grenada invasion because true U.S. national interests were not involved, and the Libyan bombing because it would not stop terrorism.

OTHER CANDIDATES so far have limited their foreign policy statements to individual issues, but already some potential litmus tests are emerging. It will be practically impossible for any candidate to be nominated who favors aid to the *contras*. Hart and Jackson oppose it. So does Representative Richard Gephardt. Senator Joe Biden says he would support the *contras* if they were a truly democratic force; since they are not yet, he votes "no." Former Virginia governor Charles Robb and Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey favor aid on the grounds that the *contras* divert Nicaragua from spreading revolution throughout Central America, but they say they are not running. Given overwhelming support in the House for total disinvestment from South Africa, it's practically inevitable that a Democratic nominee will have to favor it, regardless of the impact it might have on blacks. It's not mandatory yet for Democrats to oppose Star Wars, but by 1988 it may be, and support for a nuclear test moratorium is rapidly gaining the support that the nuclear freeze had in 1984. To win the presidency and to conduct the strong American policy that both friends and adversaries respect, the Democrats ought to make the midterm Aspin report the basis of their 1988 platform. Paul Kirk would like the candidates to think in the primaries about how their arguments will look to voters in the November election. Maybe moderation will triumph this time; more likely, the Democrats will stay hooked on "yes, but." □

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STANLEY KAUFFMANN ON FILMS

Heroes and Others

No aspect of Holocaust history is more tender than the subject of Jewish resistance. Many have puzzled over the absence of massive resistance—the "sheep to the slaughter" view. This view, as Martin Gilbert tells us in *The Holocaust*, was a bitter topic even in the ghettos. He quotes from the journals of the historian Emanuel Ringelblum, later to die in the Warsaw ghetto, who wrote in 1942:

> This question torments all of us, but there is no answer to it because everyone knows that resistance, and particularly if even one single German is killed, its outcome may lead to a slaughter of a whole community, or even of many communities.

Partisans of Vilna
(European Classics)
That's Life!
(Columbia)

Ringelblum noted the way in which evacuations were carried out, so that it was "not to everyone clear that a massacre is taking place." As for the "sheep to the slaughter" condition, he said:

> This is partly due to the complete spiritual breakdown and disintegration, caused by unheard-of terror which has been inflicted upon the Jews for three years. . . . The effect of all this taken together is that when a moment for some resistance arrives, we are completely powerless and the enemy does to us whatever he pleases.

It takes temerity to censure these matters from the safety of the present day. It also takes ignorance: because the Jews did resist. The resistance could not be called massive. (In what German-occupied country was the resistance massive? The partisans were always a minority.) But under the circumstances, not only of immediate German cruelties but of centuries of humiliating social pressures, the wonder is that there was so much Jewish resistance. The best-known example is the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto; but the Resistance entries in the indexes of Gilbert's book and Lucy S. Dawidowicz's *The War Against the Jews* provide numerous other examples.

The first resistance organization, says Dawidowicz, was set up in Vilna in January 1942, and was sparked by a meeting of 150 young Zionists who were addressed by the poet Abba Kovner. A new documentary, *Partisans of Vilna*, celebrates those fighters, and it begins with Kovner, long resident in Israel. The film was directed by Josh Waletzky, who previously made *Image Before My Eyes*, an engrossing account of Jewish life in Poland between the wars. Waletzky is a competent, straightforward director, obviously gifted as an interviewer (although we neither see nor hear him). For his new film, funded substantially by the National Endowment for the Humanities, he found 40 survivors of the Vilna resistance. He interweaves their accounts—in Hebrew and Yiddish and English—with helpful maps and with archival footage, including some of partisan activity.

We first see Abba Kovner in the Diaspora Museum of Tel Aviv, a museum that he helped to found. Then we move to his fellow survivors. Although more information about the speakers and the places of the interviews would have been useful, their stories are gripping. We learn that in the ghetto of German-occupied Vilna there were schools, an orchestra, a chorus, a theater. We learn that one of the first Vilna partisans to commit an act of sabotage against the Germans was a young woman, Vitka Kempner. We also learn of the opposition that these partisans faced from people other than Germans.

Initial objection came from other Jews—the Jewish Council that had been set up by the Germans to run the ghetto. The council was against resistance because of the risk to most Jews. (Long after the war I heard similar comments from Frenchmen about the French resistance. The partisans, they said, could run and hide after their forays; other Frenchmen had to suffer the German reprisals.) When the police arrested the partisan commandant, partisans rescued and hid him. Then anti-partisan Jews fought the Jewish partisans to recapture the commandant and turn him over to the police, thus saving the ghetto from destruction. To stop the fighting among Jews, the commandant turned himself over to the police and soon, it is thought, committed suicide.

The Jewish unit escaped to a forest near Vilna, where there were other partisan groups. The Jews were then told by a Soviet emissary that they could not continue as a unit because they didn't represent a nation. They were forced to disband and join Polish or Lithuanian groups. In those groups they encountered partisans who disliked having Jews in their midst and even threatened the lives of their Jewish fellow-fighters.

But the Jewish partisans persisted, men and women, and a number of them

FILMS WORTH SEEING

Down by Law. Black and white, ultranaturalistic until the incredible pops up. Jim Jarmusch teases us sardonically about our film gullibility in this tale of three cons who escape from a New Orleans jail. (Reviewed 9/29/86)

Otello. Franco Zeffirelli's best work. Verdi's masterpiece (abridged) is not entirely comfortable on screen, but it has splendid performances by Placido Domingo and Justino Diaz. (10/6/86)

Sherman's March. Ross McElwee started out to make a documentary retracing the Civil War march and ended with a film about the women he knew and met en route. Casual, funny, revealing. (10/13/86)

She's Gotta Have It. Lively, pungent, if occasionally derivative comedy about the sex lives of young, middle-class blacks. Spike Lee, the writer-director, is in the cast and acts well, too. (9/15 & 22/86)

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survived. One woman tells us that when she returned to Vilna after victory, she saw a Jewish mother with her child. The partisan cried, just to see "a living Jewish child."

In sheerly informational terms, *Partisans of Vilna* adds little new. But as a record of extraordinary individuals, as a means to vivify history, it is invaluable.

Blake Edwards has crossed me up. Last month, reviewing *A Fine Mess*, I noted that his main interest for years has been farce. Now, in a matter of weeks, he turns up with a domestic drama. It's called *That's Life!* It isn't! It's a ragout of old movies!

Jack Lemmon and Julie Andrews are the parents of grown children. The story, which takes place during one weekend, is built around two events: his 60th birthday, her biopsy. At the start of the picture we see the procedure in which a sample is taken from her throat. At the end we get the results. Guess whether, in a film of this kind, the report is good or bad.

Snugged into the cradle of the Andrews plot is a rerun of Lemmon's familiar middle-age-crisis performance, which as usual is laced with success-as-failure. He's an architect who has lived a life of compromise and has become rich. (Apparently Edwards remembers *L'Avventura*, but not well enough.) Lemmon is given the appropriate sexual temptations and sexual problems. Their children, who come home for the birthday party, have *their* appropriate problems. And through it all, keeping her medical problem a secret so as not to spoil the fun, is brave Julie Andrews. In fact, most of the film is modeled to make her all-wise and all-suffering in a kind of secular canonization. (She is Mrs. Edwards in what's left of her private life. Her daughter, Lemmon's son, and Edwards's daughter play the children in the film.)

What is especially depressing about *That's Life!* is not the tackiness of the biopsy-suspense plot, the crass sexual gags for Lemmon, nor the triteness of every situation and all the dialogue. It's that these offenses were committed by a man with a demonstrated sense of humor, who thus demonstrates that humor is not a kitsch-proof safeguard. In this film directed by the man who made *Victor/Victoria*, Andrews says to her gravid daughter, "Pregnancy makes a woman look so radiant." □

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

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ROBERT BRUSTEIN ON THEATER

Moonlight Serenades

Two prestigious British artistic directors got in dutch recently as a result of moonlighting: Peter Hall, who heads the National Theatre, and Trevor Nunn, who runs the Royal Shakespeare Company. Both were publicly rebuked by the London *Times* for enriching themselves at the expense of their respective institutions. It was an inflammatory charge, particularly at a time when government subsidies for British theater are dwindling, and some suspected that Rupert Murdoch and his newspaper might be retaliating against the National Theatre's bilious portrait of them in the David Hare/Howard Brenton play *Pravda*. Whatever the case, both men responded by filing court actions against the *Times* for punitive damages.

One must be careful not to prejudge the outcome of a pending suit (in England, one wouldn't even be allowed to write about it). But this flap raises some interesting issues that may help to clarify what has become an alarmingly murky area of ethical behavior for serious theater artists. The allegation by the *Times* is that Hall and Nunn have become multimillionaires through commercial enterprises, some involving their subsidized theaters, some not. Hall has been receiving royalties from productions on Broadway and the West End—*Equus* and *Amadeus* among them—while Nunn has punched musical cash registers with *Cats*, *Starlight Express*, *Les Misérables*, and other tuneful windfalls. Neither man denies that he has profited from these theatrical properties. They argue rather that their profits have been exaggerated, that their companies have profited more.

Their income from these extracurricular activities has not been disclosed. But for Nunn at least it is unquestionably high. To take the most conspicuous example, *Cats* has been playing on Broadway to 101 percent capacity for almost four years. Its weekly take is in the neighborhood of $470,000; directors normally get between one percent and ten percent of the gross, depending on their box-office power. Assuming Mr. Nunn receives a modest five percent, he is drawing royalties of over $23,000 a week, or over $1 million a year in New York alone, not counting the movie sale, the subsidiary rights, or the touring company (which can bring in more than $300,000 a week on the road).

It is considered bad form in democratic countries to criticize an artist's prerogative to command high fees (communist stage directors are actually just as demanding when weighing offers from theaters in the Free World). Many would argue that people such as Hall and Nunn have the right to get as rich as anyone else in our culture, especially since the salaries of artistic directors are not very high. Compared with the art market—where a single painting can fetch a million dollars—or with the fees commanded by superstars in opera and classical music, the subsidized theater is small potatoes. Defending his habit of supplementing his National Theatre income with commercial ventures, Peter Hall, in his *Diaries*, wrote poignantly of the financial troubles he incurred as a result of a number of failed marriages and of his inability to concentrate on work when the bill collector was continually pounding on the door. Aren't an artist's needs as pressing as those of a real estate developer? Indeed they are, but an artist also has some obligation to his calling. The theater is the performing art where people traffic most freely between commercial and serious forms. Hence, it is virtually unique in having the potential to implicate its more accomplished talents in specious activities.

Painters, opera singers, and conductors have the capacity to earn a lot of money in our culture, but they are normally paid for doing work they were trained for. In the theater, the most whopping salaries are reserved for kitsch like *Cats*, not for collective pieces like *Nicholas Nickleby*. Trevor Nunn directed them both; only the second stretched his talents. Collecting his Tony for *Cats*, Nunn remarked: "All I can do is purr." And added, "In England we dream of New York ... the place where we learn how to do musicals." But it is not unreasonable to ask how much dreaming about New York has affected his dreams of running a classical company, how much "learning how to do musicals" has transformed his approach to Shakespeare or influenced his choice of new works at the RSC.

The real issue of moonlighting, in other words, is not the way it inflates the director's money market portfolio but how it affects his talent and, by extension, his involvement with the theater he leads. It was recently revealed that Nunn had agreed to stage the musical *Chess* on Broadway with the proviso that the Shuberts agree to produce another version of *Nicholas Nickleby*. This somewhat Faustian contract at least involved the RSC—but in an act of commerce, not of art. Compare the negotiations of these establishment directors with the behavior of such committed artists as Peter Brook or Jerzy Grotowski or Giorgio Streher or Ariane Mnouchkine or Peter Stein, none of whom (Brook excepted in early career) ever even contemplated working on the commercial stage or long abandoned their companies (unless, like Grotowski, to abandon the theater). The result of their exemplary fidelity was a series of works uncompromising in their vision, unsparing in their purpose, created by actors indifferent to wide audiences or extravagant spectacles.

I'm suggesting that a serious consequence of excessive moonlighting is damage to the company's sense of loyalty insofar as the director's truancy inevitably communicates itself to other members of the group. When Laurence Olivier, still director of the National, agreed to do some TV commercials, he stipulated that they be shown only in the United States, lest he compromise his reputation among his English acting peers. No such provisos appear in the contracts of his successors in the British theater establishment. Nunn accepts tasteless musical assignments on the West End as well as on Broadway, while Hall seems to spend more time each year away from his theater than with it. Partly for this reason, the great days of English acting companies, the days when Olivier, Scofield, Finney, Richardson, and Gielgud could occupy the same stage, are over. No sooner does a gifted actor appear on the scene than he is whipped off to movies, television, or the commercial stage, contributing only minimal service to the classical company that brought him to prominence.

Of equal seriousness is the influence of moonlighting on a company's choice

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of plays. It is hardly accidental that the commercial preoccupations of Hall and Nunn have coincided with a significant decline in the adventurousness of their theaters. In a sense, the RSC and the National are moonlighting whenever they transfer a production to the West End because the actors are then working under different contracts in plays designed for popular audiences. Although not without danger, it is one thing to move a show to a commercial venue for the sake of reaching more spectators or even bringing additional income to a sorely undersubsidized theater. It is quite another to organize a season in the hope that a percentage of the choices will prove to be commercial hits. Such decisions may well be unconscious; they are certainly subtle and hard to verify. But they are nonetheless insidious, and they are proving significant enough to stimulate talk now in London arts circles of limiting the number of products a subsidized theater can transfer to the West End.

No such talk is heard in our own country, where moonlighting and commercial transfers—often under the auspices of the nonprofit institution—are not only approved but encouraged. The artistic director of one large theatrical institution is currently on an indeterminate leave of absence to direct movies, plays, and operas throughout the world. Another—having declared Broadway the "Mecca" toward which everyone aspires—is remounting two works from his repertoire in several cities around the country, with New York as their final destination. One does not wish to suggest limits on the possibilities of talented directors in a culture of opportunity. But to accept the leadership of a theater is to assume certain obligations and responsibilities. For years, I have annoyed theater people with moralistic sermons on the way we exalt careers and celebrity at the expense of growth and development. I have worried particularly about the corruption of the nonprofit theater movement by commercial opportunism. Now the situation seems to be reaching a head and at last the consequences are being seen. The crises at the RSC and the National, and the stir over Trevor Nunn and Peter Hall, are object lessons in what happens to a theater when private ambition displaces institutional loyalties, when personal needs overshadow the good of the whole. □

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

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

THE WISE MEN
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Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas

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How Vietnam created a regional communist empire.

THE HANOI PACT

BY ELIZABETH BECKER

POL POT'S name has seeped into the national vocabulary as shorthand for murderous behavior defying explanation, for sadism, atrocities, and destruction as limitless as the human imagination. Nowadays there is no more damning accusation for a communist movement or government than comparison with the Khmer Rouge. When announcing American recognition of the new government of Corazon Aquino, for example, Secretary of State George Shultz used the occasion to observe about the communist guerrillas in the Philippines that they would make Pol Pot "blush." (Having met the Cambodian communist leader and examined the horrors resulting from his revolution, I must say that I doubt that anything the Filipino communists have done would offend his sense of propriety.)

This is not simply propaganda. One of the reasons it is easy to worry that every new revolutionary movement might be led by a new Pol Pot or become a new Khmer Rouge is that little has been published about the nature of the Khmer Rouge and the twisted visions that led them to oversee an upheaval that left nearly one-fourth of their own population dead and Cambodian society destroyed. And, perhaps as important, the saga of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge is not over. Pol Pot has managed to escape punishment for his crimes; he has yet to be indicted by an international court or forum. Instead, today he is leading his troops somewhere in western Cambodia. And his army is growing, with lavish support from China and the approval of the United States, winning new recruits among his countrymen, who have become disenchanted and disgusted with the Vietnamese dominion over their country. Worse, Pol Pot's has become the chief fighting force capable of taking advantage of this resentment against seven years of Vietnamese occupation.

Pol Pot's reprieve is more than an extraordinary turn of events. It is one of several cynical and brutal manifestations of power in Indochina. Communist Vietnam is occupying its communist neighbor in the first war ever fought between two communist states. This war follows two wars of overwhelming destruction that were supposed to have put an end to further bloodshed in the area.

The best way to make sense of this war is to view it as the result of the idea of Indochinese communism. The concept of a regional communism—of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam bound together by an intricate series of agreements that gives Vietnam control over the three countries—has haunted the Cambodians and inspired the Vietnamese since it was first conceived in 1930. Today, more than 50 years later, after invading Cambodia and capturing the capital, Phnom Penh, on January 7, 1979, the Vietnamese have created precisely such a situation.

It is the first regional communist power bloc outside the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union's Eastern European satellites, and an original and peculiar addition to the communist world. It might be called the Hanoi Pact. Ho Chi Minh is portrayed as the father of this Indochinese communism. His portrait is displayed with those of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The existence of this Indochinese communist bloc is one of the chief reasons why the third Indochina war could become as destructive as the previous two, why the stalemate in Cambodia is so intractable, and why Pol Pot, the man who oversaw the deaths of nearly two million Cambodians, has resurrected enough support among his countrymen to mount a guerrilla war against the Vietnamese.

Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930-1985
by MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff
(Hoover Institution Press, 350 pp., $13.95)

How Pol Pot Came to Power
by Ben Kiernan
(Verso, 430 pp., $12.95)

Cambodia 1975-1982
by Michael Vickery
(South End Press, 350 pp., $25, $9 paper)

The Stones Cry Out: A Cambodian Childhood, 1975-1980
by Molyda Szymusiak
(Hill and Wang, 245 pp., $17.95)

Vietnamese Gulag
by Doan Van Toai and David Chanoff
(Simon and Schuster, 256 pp., $18.95)

I.

There have been three Indochinese wars. The first began in 1946 and was primarily fought by the Vietnamese communists against the returning French colonialists. It ended in 1954. The second war was ours, the American war, fought by communists in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia against anti-communist governments in each country and against the United States. It lasted from 1960 until 1975. The third war is a thoroughly communist affair between Vietnam and the Cambodian regime of Pol Pot. It began in December 1978 and continues today, largely fought by Pol Pot's guerrillas against the occupation army of Vietnam and its new client communist regime in Phnom Penh. (Two small non-communist armies are also fighting against the Vietnamese, but their strength is diminishing.)

At the center of these decades of battle is communist Vietnam, fighting in turn, in Hanoi's words, French colonialism, American imperialism, and the aggression of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique. That last enemy seems out of place in the lineup. In their first wars, the Vietnamese communists were fighting superior foreign powers on Vietnamese soil. In this war, Vietnam invaded and occupied a far weaker neighbor. (Vietnam is a country of 60 million, Cambodia of some six and a half million.)

Vietnam claims it had to invade and occupy Cambodia to protect its national security. Cambodia had indeed instigated a border war with Vietnam, but it was hardly serious enough to threaten Vietnam's security. Moreover, the Cambodian communists also initiated clashes on their western border with Thailand

Elizabeth Becker is the author of *When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and Its People*, just published by Simon and Schuster.

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without provoking the same extreme response. A few Vietnamese spokesmen have suggested that their nation invaded Cambodia to save it from the monstrous Pol Pot regime, but the top Vietnamese leadership has denied this, sticking to the national security excuse and avoiding any endorsement of an invasion in the name of human rights. After seven years of evidence and hindsight about the protracted Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, the real reason for the third war is clear. Vietnam invaded Cambodia to realize its old goal of controlling the three countries that had formed the French colonial Indochinese union. That is what links this war to the others, and gives meaning to the three as a whole.

THIS IS NOT TO suggest melodramatically that Hanoi has had a secret master plan for 50 years, as many of Vietnam's critics say all too easily. The story is far more interesting than such a simple conspiracy theory. It begins in 1930, when three Vietnamese communist organizations applied to the Communist International to found their own separate parties—for northern (Tonkin), central (Annam), and southern (Cochinchina) Vietnam. The International disapproved. It sent its representative, Ho Chi Minh, to meet with the leaders in Hong Kong in February of that year. The three groups agreed to form one party, and provisionally named it the Vietnamese Communist Party. But Ho Chi Minh was sent to meet the leaders again, in October, with new orders from the International to broaden the Party further into an Indochinese Communist Party including Laos and Cambodia. The Vietnamese complied.

The concept of an Indochinese communism, then, was proposed by the International and accepted by the Vietnamese. They had different reasons. In 1930, Moscow still believed that the industrial proletariat of Europe, and not the underdeveloped world, was the natural constituency for communism. Since the French ruled the three countries as one, Moscow simply imposed this imperialist structure on the new Communist Party. Thus French colonialism became the basis for a new form of colonialism—Indochinese communism.

The Vietnamese accepted their role as historically preordained. Before the French intervened, the Vietnamese had expanded their country into what is now southern Vietnam, at the expense of the Cambodian state. They also regularly threatened both Laos and Cambodia

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

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

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with further encroachments. (The Vietnamese had briefly occupied Cambodia in the middle of the 19th century.) Under French rule, the Vietnamese drive did not exactly end; it merely took a new form. The French quickly concluded that the Vietnamese were the superior of the three peoples. Their Confucian system seemed modern to the French when compared with the Buddhist cultures of Cambodia and Laos. The colonizers regularly lauded the colonized Vietnamese as the industrious master race not chained to a faith of otherworldliness. Generally they accorded the Vietnamese a special status within the Indochinese colonial union, which they had themselves created by the turn of the century, carving it out of the three Southeast Asian countries they were able to conquer in their quest for control of China. In fact, these countries had little in common other than this artificial union. Cambodia and Laos were influenced by India; Vietnam was colonized by China. The two Buddhist nations share a culture that is nearly the Asian antithesis of Vietnam's.

IN FRENCH INDOCHINA, the Vietnamese became the minor bureaucrats who helped hold the union together. Vietnamese laborers were brought in to work the new Cambodian plantations. Vietnamese entrepreneurs set up shop in Phnom Penh and Vientiane. Vietnamese became the second language, after French, in both those capitals. Vietnamese claims were upheld by the French when drawing up boundaries. The French ruled Indochina, in short, under the open assumption that the Vietnamese would eventually become the majority race in all three countries.

The Vietnamese who became communists were not immune to their national past or prejudices. The new Indochinese Communist Party leaders not only accepted their appointed task of building movements in Cambodia and Laos, they devised a model for a communist Indochina. It would operate as a soviet, with the Cambodian and Lao people accorded the status of minorities within it. The Vietnamese majority would decide whether Cambodia and Laos could operate as separate, independent countries within the Indochina soviet.

Their scheme had been adopted by the time the International officially accepted the membership of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1935. But the Vietnamese found few recruits for their Party in either Cambodia or Laos. Then World War II, and the triumph of the Japanese fascists, shook French control and helped to nurture nationalism in all three countries. It was at this stage that Ho Chi Minh returned to his country after decades in exile. Ho was a rarity in Asian communism, as much an internationalist as a nationalist when he began leading his country's communist movement. He left Vietnam as a young student and ended up in Paris. In 1920 he attended the founding congress of the French Communist Party at Tours, where he was remembered for his passionate appeal to include anti-colonialism in the Party's agenda. From Paris he moved to Moscow, and became a student and bureaucrat for the International. His intercession in the formation of the Indochinese Communist Party was at the behest of the International, which also sent him to China to aid the revolutionary movement there, and finally to all of Southeast Asia, where he was the International's agent for organizing revolutions in the region. When he finally returned to Vietnam in 1941, at the age of 51, he was not a veteran of the anti-colonialist movement in his own country, but he was a hero, one of the few Vietnamese known nationwide for his outspoken appeals for Vietnamese independence, even if those appeals were made abroad.

Once in Vietnam, however, Ho quickly overruled the International and changed tactics. In the year of his return he created the nationalist united front of Vietnam known as the Viet Minh (the League for Vietnamese Independence) and discreetly put the ICP at its core, directing the fight against Japan and the French.

FOUR YEARS LATER, at the end of the Second World War and on the eve of the First Indochina War, the ICP went underground. When it re-emerged, it was renamed the Vietnam Workers Party. The Vietnamese ordered their Lao and Cambodian communist members to organize their own separate parties, and to capitalize on the nationalist nature of the war. Yet Vietnam's Party did not want to give up control. In November 1951, one of its documents noted that

> the Vietnamese party reserves the right to supervise the activities of its brother parties in Cambodia and Laos.... Later, however, if conditions permit, the three revolutionary parties of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos will be able to unite to form a single party: the Party of the Vietnam-Khmer-Laotian Federation.

(At this time both the Cambodian and Lao communist movements were small. In 1951, the Cambodians formed an organization to begin building a Party; the Lao founded a Party in 1955.)

In the years that followed, the idea of an Indochina-wide Party was submerged in the rhetoric of fierce nationalism. It disappeared from official Vietnamese publications. The three communist movements routinely declared their Indochinese solidarity, but proposed no plan for consolidating the movements or the countries. In 1970, when the Second Indochina War expanded into Cambodia, the Cambodian communists joined the Lao and Vietnamese at the first Indochinese summit to proclaim their joint struggle against American imperialism. They repeated the rationale of the First Indochina War—that since the enemy used all of Indochina as a single battlefield, so too should the communists.

Between those two wars, however, the idea of Indochinese communist solidarity had cracked over Cambodia. That is the subject, implicitly or explicitly, of most of the books under review.

II.

Ho Chi Minh was a man of action rather than of doctrine, as Jean Lacouture noted years ago. At his death in 1969, Ho left few pronouncements on his philosophy or ideology. It is through the actions of the Vietnamese communists toward the Lao and Cambodian Parties that one can judge the long-term intentions of Vietnam about the construction of a regional bloc. A kind reading would see the Vietnamese as merely too paternalistic, presuming they knew better than Cambodian and Lao communists what was in each revolution's best interest; the Vietnamese took credit for creating both Parties, and for determining the proper path for the revolutions. But the fact remains that the proper path was always the one that saw the triumph of Vietnam's revolution as the primary goal.

Since this question is at the heart of the current war, it is useful to work backward, to begin with the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The Vietnamese went about consolidating an Indochinese bloc with deliberate speed. In February 1979, only one month after securing the capital, but while their troops were still

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fighting the Khmer Rouge in western Cambodia, the Vietnamese signed a "friendship treaty" with the new Cambodian communists they had brought to power with their invasion. The treaty conveniently legalized the presence of the 200,000 Vietnamese soldiers pacifying the country. (Until then, the Vietnamese denied that even one of their soldiers had taken part in the overthrow of the Pol Pot government, known as Democratic Kampuchea.) The treaty, more generally, locked Cambodia under Vietnamese control. Thereafter military, political, economic, and foreign affairs were guided—if not actually dictated—by the Vietnamese. Potential bureaucrats, politicians, professional and Party cadres for this new Cambodia were shuttled regularly to Vietnam, where they underwent training to ensure that they, unlike the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, accepted their role within an Indochinese bloc.

I saw some of the brighter evidence of Vietnamese determination one hot August afternoon in Hanoi. It was 1979, seven months after the invasion, and the deadly calm of the dining room at my hotel—the Danchu (the Democracy)—was briefly dispelled by a troop of Cambodian children dashing around the tables. They were sightseeing in the Vietnamese capital, dressed in the uniform of Communist young pioneers. Their chaperone said the children were all orphaned during the revolution of Pol Pot. Theirs was only one of several tours to Vietnam for Cambodians designed to demonstrate the solidarity among the Indochinese peoples and the concern of the Vietnamese for the welfare of the Cambodians.

That same year the welfare of the Vietnamese people was itself in doubt. It was the worst year since the American war had ended, and they had all been bad. There was not enough rice, let alone meat or vegetables. Children were suffering malnutrition at one of the highest rates in the world. And the country's resources had been diverted to the invasion and pacification of Cambodia, leaving even less to spare to alleviate poverty at home. Still, the dream had come true: Indochinese communism was a reality. Now the Hanoi communists could be flexible on matters that less than a year earlier had been nearly holy writ. The economic crackdown of 1978, for example, was eased with the reforms that were begun in late 1979. The economy, social mores, the question of public and private property—those immutable issues were re-examined, and liberalization was allowed.

But one policy remained beyond challenge or change—the policy toward Cambodia. In an interview that August, Nguyen Co Thach, now foreign minister of Vietnam, told me that Vietnam's position in Cambodia was irreversible. He also said that Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos together would create an Indochina bloc similar to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (ASEAN now includes the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.) Today, seven years later, Thach and his country appear to have stayed the course.

Early in 1983 the Vietnamese finally convened an Indochinese summit—the first since 1970, when war broke out in Cambodia during the Second Indochina War. The Vietnamese prepared for this summit carefully and created a ministerial-level position in their government to coordinate Indochinese relations. At the summit, the Vietnamese formalized their relations with Laos and Cambodia by signing several agreements for cooperation in eco-

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nomic development, trade, and communications. (There are no such treaties between Laos and Cambodia; the locus of power is uncontested.)

Today, Vietnam has more soldiers posted in Laos than the entire Lao army, and almost triple the number of the embryonic Cambodian army. Vietnamese advisers determine policy in nearly all fields in Laos and Cambodia. Lao and Cambodian officials, professionals, and bureaucrats are still called, often with scant notice, to attend "study sessions" in Vietnam for political indoctrination. Consolidation of Vietnam's Indochina bloc takes priority over reconstruction in Cambodia and economic progress in Laos.

III.

The idea of Indochina as a historical and geographical entity is so taken for granted today that none of the books under review examines precisely how, in its contemporary communist form, it came to be. All the authors, it should be said, have avoided the common mistake of claiming that what made the war between Cambodia and Vietnam inevitable was racial and national hatred. To be sure, there is competition between the countries: they have a long history of warfare, and subscribe to any number of insulting racial and cultural stereotypes about each other. But like other tense neighbors—France and Germany, for instance—their antipathies have to be fueled by demagoguery for there to be war.

MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff explore the early history and French colonial past of Laos in their authoritative book, *Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930-1985*. They review the history of the Indochinese Communist Party and its failure to recruit native Lao until the outbreak of the Second World War. Once the Vietnamese communists began enlisting a small number of Lao into their Indochinese Party, however, the Lao proved themselves perfect "apprentice revolutionaries"—a superb title. Thereafter, Lao communist history is one clear thread. The Lao recruited and trained by the Vietnamese became the first leaders of the Lao communist movement, then leaders of the united front against the return of the French colonial powers, then leaders of a separate Lao Communist Party created in 1955. And after 20 more years of warfare, they became the leaders of the present-day Lao Peoples Democratic Republic.

Kaysone Phomvihan and Nouhak Phoumsavan, the two top leaders of the Lao Communist Party and the Lao government today, are both creatures of the Indochinese Communist Party. Kaysone was recruited into the ICP in Hanoi, where he was a student. He was sent back to Laos to fight the Japanese and build a Lao movement in 1945. According to Brown and Zasloff, Nouhak was "probably under the control of the ICP" by 1946, when he attended an important meeting with Kaysone in Hanoi and became the chairman of propaganda in the anti-French struggle in Laos. Both men accepted tutelage from the ever-present Vietnamese advisers and protection from the Vietnamese communist army. More crucially, they seemed to have accepted Vietnamese strategies and goals for an Indochina-wide struggle that often gave the war in Vietnam priority over the wars in Laos and Cambodia. Their reward was nothing less than victory and leadership of their country.

HOW SIMPLE Indochina would be today if the Cambodian communist movement had followed the Lao example. But in their careful distillation of Lao communist history, Brown and Zasloff show how the Lao were particularly suited for their role as apprentice revolutionaries. Laos was one of those small countries that suffered permanent dismemberment under colonial rule. To appease the Siamese kingdom, the French ceded all Lao territory south of the Mekong to Bangkok, making the lowland Lao a minority in their own country. The "majority" is the elusive category of hill tribespeople, not a single tribe but a variety of ethnic groups with little traditional respect for geographic ties, much less political loyalty to the lowland Lao.

Even before dismemberment, however, Laos was small and weak, with competing dynasties. Afterward, it was minuscule and in need of a powerful patron. Vietnam, on the other hand, is a giant. Today's population figures reflect the proportions that have existed through most of this century—Laos has four million, compared to Vietnam's 60 million. The question for Laos, then, was which patron—Vietnam to the east, or Thailand to the south and west. Before 1947, Lao independence fighters could look in both directions for support, and there actually was a question of who would win control. But after the 1947 military coup against the liberal Thai government of Pridi Phanomyong, Thailand became off-limits for independence fighters, and the Vietnamese communists became the unchallenged patrons of the Lao independence and communist movement.

The rest is the history of the Vietnamese war, during which the two battlefields, as well as the two Communist Parties and armies, were integrated in an unbreakable partnership, unequal though it was, between patron and apprentice.

IV.

Cambodia is the flip side of the Lao communist experience, at least as far as the Vietnamese are concerned. The story of the growth of Cambodia's Communist Party is neither clear nor coherent, especially to its own members. Instead, disputes over the history of the Party, from its actual birthdate to the role of the Vietnamese in shaping or misshaping the Party, occasioned some of the bloodiest purges during the Cambodian revolution. Cambodian and Vietnamese communists point to these arguments, to their ongoing disputes about cooperation and competition, as the key to their current war.

Cambodia as a country was unfit for an apprentice role. It was too large and too proud to be absorbed as a satellite. The French colonial experience may have crippled Cambodia, but the nation was left intact. Sociologically, moreover, it was a country of rare homogeneity. The great majority of Cambodians spoke a common language (Khmer), practiced a common faith (Buddhism), and accepted a common heritage, which they traced back to the Angkor era and believed was personified by the Khmer monarchy. They also shared a common fear of transgressions by their powerful neighbors—Thailand and Vietnam.

The Cambodians who became communists were sensitive about Vietnamese intentions, even as they accepted Vietnamese leadership in the early years of their movement. But neither the Cambodian nationalist movement nor the Cambodian communist movement was entirely the product of Vietnamese communist proselytizing. The roots were diverse, and some of the strongest were indigenous. The first Cambodian communists were recruited variously by the Thai Communist Party, the French Communist Party, and the Indochinese Com-

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munist Party. While Vietnam was undoubtedly the most important patron of the Cambodian communist movement in its earliest state, particularly during the First Indochina War, there were always questions about the divisive nature of Vietnamese support.

POL POT'S EARLY years in the movement are illustrative. The son of a somewhat prosperous farmer, Pol Pot, born Saloth Sar, became aware of his country's nationalist movement as a student in Phnom Penh and became a communist as a student in Paris from 1949 to 1953. He and his fellow Cambodian communists in Paris worked closely with Vietnamese communists, to the chagrin of other Cambodian students who thought that an Indochinese communist movement represented a sellout to the Vietnamese.

Norodom Sihanouk himself regularly leveled that accusation of dependence and subservience against Cambodian communists. But Pol Pot and his comrades took early steps to probe the degree of independence allowed within the concept of socialist internationalism, as well as within the concept of Indochinese communism. While studying in France, Pol Pot took off one summer for Yugoslavia, where he worked on a road crew and, by his own account, absorbed and admired Yugoslavia's independence from the Soviet Union—at a time when the communist world was condemning Tito for his independent stance. He returned to Cambodia in time to join the ICP and take part in the last months of the war. He was detailed to a mixed unit of Vietnamese and Cambodians led by the Vietnamese, and witnessed the effect of the war's end on his country's communist movement.

At the Geneva Conference in 1954, the Cambodian communists alone were denied seats. It was determined that the Cambodian communists did not hold sufficient territory to be considered a party to the negotiations, that only Sihanouk's government represented Cambodia. The Lao communists were seated and won a territorial base bordering on northern Vietnam, which became the Democratic Republic of Vietnam after the communists accepted the division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel.

That loss of a base inside Cambodia led the Vietnamese communists to make one of the more momentous decisions in the history of Cambodian communism. The Vietnamese quite literally divided the Cambodian movement in half. Following the Geneva Conference, they took Son Ngoc Minh, the leader of the communist movement, and some thousand followers into exile in northern Vietnam, where they remained for nearly 20 years. In the course of the intervening years, confusion arose about who held power over the Cambodian movement—the leader in Hanoi or the leader inside the country. That confusion became competition, and then outright hostility.

The Cambodian communist movement floundered in the '50s. Sihanouk was a popular ruler and became accepted as the father of his country's independence. He enlisted the non-communist nationalists into his own political party after independence and successfully isolated the communists by means of his rhetoric, his charm, and his police. Moreover, the in-country communist leader secretly went over to Sihanouk's side and spied on his own party, until he publicly turned himself in in 1959. The Cambodian communists had lost one leader to exile, the other to Sihanouk.

The next year, 1960, the Cambodian communists held a congress that produced a genuine Marxist-Leninist party with a new leader, and Pol Pot third in command. Undoubtedly this was coordinated with the Vietnamese communists, for in that very year the communists in South Vietnam shifted their strategy from political agitation to an armed struggle against the Saigon government. Two years later the newest leader of the Cambodian communists disappeared under mysterious circumstances, and Pol Pot was selected to head the Party.

FROM ALL accounts, Pol Pot was a dynamic and demanding leader. During the '50s he built up the Party in Phnom Penh. After becoming Party secretary, he and most of his central committee fled the capital and set up Party headquarters near the Vietnamese border. This was still the period of cooperation with the Vietnamese communists, and of confusion. Most of the communist world believed Cambodia was still part of an Indochinese Party. Hanoi still accorded the exiled leader Son Ngoc Minh the status of titular leader of the Cambodian communists. And all communist regimes curried Sihanouk's favor in an attempt to encourage his continued neutrality, to prevent the United States from establishing bases in Cambodia.

This fragile situation broke apart un-

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der the pressures of the war in Vietnam and of the Cambodian communists' own reading of their country's internal problems. In 1967, the communists decided it was time to start an armed struggle against Sihanouk's government. That decision was welcomed by neither the Vietnamese nor the Chinese communists, both of whom considered Vietnam the battlefield for defeating American imperialism. They wanted Sihanouk kept in power and Cambodia kept neutral. In the event, Sihanouk was overthrown from the right, not the left, in 1970. Thenceforth the communists' strategy shifted, and they lined up behind Sihanouk as the figurehead for a war against the new rightist regime in Phnom Penh.

ON THE surface, Cambodia's entry into the Second Indochina War seemed to rekindle the spirit of Indochinese solidarity. Posters appeared with soldiers of the three countries fighting alongside each other. An Indochina summit was convened in southern China in 1970, with leaders of the three Indochinese communist movements pledging support to the end. (Sihanouk represented the Cambodian communists' front.) But in fact, 1970 marked the emergence of open hostility between the Cambodian and Vietnamese communists—that is, open toward each other, but masked for the outside world. The Vietnamese communists wanted mixed Vietnamese and Cambodian combat units and mixed military command in Cambodia. The Cambodians refused. In their view, the years of disputes, divisions, and suspicion justified some coordination, some cooperation, but nothing more. Soon the ruthlessness that became the hallmark of the Khmer Rouge showed itself on the battlefield and in dealings with supposed allies; when the Vietnamese sent back the Cambodians who had been exiled in North Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge eventually tried to execute them all, fearful that they were part of a Vietnamese plot to regain control over the Cambodian communists.

The first years of cooperation on the battlefield of Cambodia came to a halt when the Vietnamese communists signed the Paris peace accords with the United States in January 1973. The Cambodian communists refused even to discuss a cease-fire. Thereafter the Vietnamese communists dramatically reduced the amount of military aid for their Cambodian comrades. By the time both armies won their wars in 1975, the animosity was firmly established. Soon after victory, the Vietnamese wanted to negotiate changes in, or refinements of, the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. The Vietnamese asked the Cambodian communist government to sign a "friendship treaty," as the Lao communist government did. The Cambodians perceived a plot, and instigated the border war that eventually led to Vietnam's decision to invade and to solve the Cambodian problem once and for all.

ALL THIS is a lean version of a complex and hateful feud that has caused countless deaths. In *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, Ben Kiernan explores this feud in rich detail; it is his book's most important contribution. But Kiernan sets that story within the confines of the debate as the Cambodian and Vietnamese communists have defined it. Thus he often ignores whole areas of investigation that might work against his thesis. For in that debate, Kiernan is firmly on the side of the Vietnamese. His book is an impassioned presentation of the Vietnamese bill of particulars against the Cambodians. He not only believes the Cambodians should have followed the Vietnamese lead throughout the Indochinese wars; he blames the horrors of the Khmer Rouge rule on their failure to do so.

Kiernan's appetite for research is prodigious. He provides countless new details about the people and disputes that propelled Cambodian communism down its grim path. But try as he may, he cannot squeeze the problems of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge into the category of "anti-Vietnamese." The Cambodian communist dispute with the Vietnamese is only one element—albeit an important one—in the panorama of fears, xenophobia, ultranationalism, and ideology that produced the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge revolution. Kiernan fails to account for the radical nationalism that has bedeviled Cambodia in the modern era, preferring simply to pin it on the anti-Vietnamese attitude of some of the Khmer elite. (In his introductory chapter on the origins of Cambodian politics, he devotes all of two pages to the French colonial period, all of four-and-a-half pages to divisions within the Buddhist clergy over questions of modernity, and all of 11 pages to the ICP.)

Instead of examining the conflicts within Cambodia's often violent society and looking beyond the Cambodia-Vietnam split, Kiernan invents a polemic. He divides the Cambodian communists into two groups: the veterans of the ICP whom he infers are loyal to Vietnam as a patron, and a competing group that he variously describes as former students, students returned from France, or simply the Pol Pot group. Whenever the Cambodian communist movement takes a turn that Kiernan considers too radical, or opposed to Vietnamese interests, he blames it on the Pol Pot group, and implies or states that the ICP veteran group opposed the move. But such a division simply did not exist. There were too few communists who fit either category: the ICP was a legacy of the First Indochina War, and only a small percentage of Cambodians who got to study in France became communists. Moreover, when the Cambodian communists came to power, the first Party member purged was the intellectual Hou Youn, who had studied in France. His close comrade, Hu Nim, also a former student from France, was tortured and executed as well. But the second in command of the Party, Nuon Chea, the loyal deputy to Pol Pot from 1962 to the present, is an ICP veteran. Finally, and unfortunately for Kiernan's thesis, the one man who is a bridge between the students who returned from France and ICP veterans is none other than Pol Pot—the only communist leader who was both.

KIERNAN IS trying to create as clear an apprentice role for the Cambodian communists as for the Lao. The good communists are those who eventually sided with the Vietnamese in 1978. They were rewarded by becoming the leaders of the government put into power by the Vietnamese occupation forces. Thus Kiernan calls the Cambodian communists' refusal in 1970 to accept mixed command units and mixed leadership "anti-Vietnamese." But the Cambodians were behaving like any other highly nationalistic communist movement—like the Vietnamese, for instance. Was Ho Chi Minh anti-Soviet when he defied Joseph Stalin and fought against the return of French colonialists? And can Kiernan imagine the Vietnamese accepting a mixed command with the Chinese communists, who were as important patrons for the Vietnamese at the start of the First Indochina War as the Vietnamese were for the Cambodians at the start of their con-

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flict within the Second Indochina War?

But Kiernan requires some "good" communists as well. By the end of his book he has even located them geographically, in the East Zone of the country. (The Khmer Rouge continued to use their military demarcations after their victory, erasing the old provincial boundaries.) The East Zone borders on Vietnam; it is the area with the greatest number of territorial disputes between the two countries. These East Zone communists are described by Kiernan as the humane Khmer Rouge, who consistently opposed the radical "center" of Pol Pot. They are, of course, the Khmer Rouge who fled Cambodia during the last months of the revolution, when Pol Pot feared they were in league with the Vietnamese and ordered them massacred; they fled across the border and joined the Vietnamese to become the rulers of the new communist Cambodia under Vietnamese occupation.

In truth these Khmer Rouge were hardly the humane alternative Kiernan describes. Kiernan tendentiously imagines a Party "center," composed of Pol Pot and others but separate from the Party's central committee, that managed to thwart the good intentions of a moderate wing within the Party and at the same time to avoid the censure and the control of the Party leadership. Such a center, however, did not exist. There was a center, but it was the shorthand name for the Party's ruling central committee. Throughout the war and during the revolution, the East Zone communists, like all other Khmer Rouge, followed the directives of the Party, murdering the Cambodian communists who returned from North Vietnam, murdering minorities, ordering the people into labor camps, working with the security police to arrest and to kill class and Party enemies.

KIERNAN'S book ends with the communist victory in 1975 and does not describe the revolution itself. In his conclusion, Kiernan describes the 1973 decision to boycott the Paris peace talks as the "watershed" for Cambodian communism. Once Vietnam and Laos agreed to cease-fires in 1973, the United States was legally prohibited from bombing those countries. Instead it launched a chilling and murderous bombing campaign against the Cambodian communists, which caused an outcry in the United States. Kiernan blames the Khmer Rouge for not accepting a cease-fire and thus walking into the American bombing. Moreover, he continues, the bombing hardened the Khmer communists and promoted revenge rather than "positive political or social goals." He also claims the bombing undermined "moderate" communist leaders and led "many villagers" to come to the conclusion that "close cooperation between Khmers and Vietnamese was no longer possible or even desirable." Finally, he writes that the bombing prevented "an inevitable insurgent victory in 1973."

But if an insurgent victory was so inevitable, why should the communists have agreed to a cease-fire? They would have been throwing away their alleged advantage and allowing the Phnom Penh government to catch its breath, bring in supplies, and prepare for a counteroffensive. In fact, that is exactly what Lon Nol had in mind when he declared a unilateral cease-fire immediately after the Paris accords were signed. He knew a cease-fire was his chief hope of halting the Khmer Rouge drive.

The effect of the bombing on the communists and the rural population, furthermore, is less clear than Kiernan believes. The Vietnamese communists themselves have said that they suffered far more massive bombings over many more years than the Khmer Rouge with-

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out becoming radical communists. I was a reporter in Cambodia from the first to the last day (August 15, 1973) of the bombing, and the response of the victims and refugees was not what Kiernan describes. They hated the bombing and they hated the war, and they streamed in from the countryside to Phnom Penh seeking refuge from both. The peasants never mentioned what effects the bombing had on Vietnamese-Cambodian communist cooperation. The Khmer Rouge did not even refer to themselves as communists, much less discuss the notion of cooperation with villagers. The villagers were not always sure who was responsible for the bombing, nor did they automatically side with the Khmer Rouge over the government in Phnom Penh because of the bombing.

Finally, the prospect of a political upheaval in Phnom Penh in support of a left-wing government is without foundation. Neither side would have allowed that to happen. As the Lon Nol regime came closer to defeat, the people became discouraged, but they hardly became militant and they certainly did not begin demanding a change to a left-wing government. Moreover, Sihanouk was a titular leader whom the Khmer Rouge would never have allowed to return to power.

KIERNAN'S BOOK is not the story of Cambodia's communist movement, of Pol Pot's accession to power. It is the (generally approving) story of Vietnam's attempt to bring Cambodia into the orbit of Indochinese communism. In another, more openly polemical book, *Cambodia 1975-1982*, Michael Vickery would like to end up with the same conclusion as Kiernan: that the East Zone communists who escaped the purge and worked with the Vietnamese are now rightfully leading the country. They are the good communists. That is, they are the communists willing to draw Cambodia into Vietnam's Indochina. They were the faithful members of the Party while Pol Pot led it, and fled only when the regime targeted their zone for a purge. The fact that they are now faithfully following the Vietnamese adds a tone of bitterness and savagery to the current war; it is an intraparty fight, as well as a battle over dominance of Indochina. But Vickery (like Kiernan) fails to show that the East Zone communists were qualitatively more humane during the revolution than the leaders of other zones. They purged minorities in their zones—particularly the Moslem Cham community. They executed those considered class enemies. They followed, in short, all the directives of the revolution.

V.

Indochina today is dreary. Its economies, its cultures, its daily life are spartan and bleak. Laos, the one country to escape the Third Indochina War's attempt to bring Cambodia into a communist Indochina, exemplifies the effect Indochinese communism has had on the region. Laos is a satellite of Vietnam. Lao policy is controlled by Vietnam. And as Brown and Zasloff note, any accomplishments of postwar Laos have to be balanced against "the staggering fact that close to a tenth of the nation was willing to leave its native soil," which is an "indictment of the government's campaign to lift the nation into a better life." To this day, the Lao income per capita is estimated to be the lowest in the region. The communist regime has plans to improve literacy and health, but all such projects hinge on "foreign and multilateral assistance," which hinge in turn on Vietnam's role in the international arena and international commerce. But Vietnam has locked into the Soviet system; it is regarded by a majority of countries as the transgressor in Cambodia and not fit for trade or good relations. Laos remains, as Brown and Zasloff report, "primitive." This tie to Vietnam, say the authors (who know Laos extremely well and are among the few experts on the subject), is "the price of victory paid by the [Lao communists]." While the failures of Laos are not unique in the postcolonial era, they continue: "The degree to which its progress is tied to the foreign policy of its neighbor and mentor ... makes it another poignant victim of the dream that a national liberation movement led by a Marxist-Leninist party can provide the key to national development."

But nothing in Laos, or any other communist nation, can compare to the revolutionary horrors of Pol Pot's Cambodia. At last there is a memoir in English that portrays that horror. *The Stones Cry Out*, originally published in French, is by far the best of the memoirs about Cambodia. To understand how the Vietnamese could so easily defeat the Cambodian communist regime in 1979 and initially find support for their occupation, one need only read this book. Its author, one of the privileged of Phnom Penh whose relatives are members of the Sisowath branch of the royal family, was a girl of 12 when the Khmer Rouge forces won in 1975. She has the particular sensitivity of a girl becoming a woman—curious, vulnerable, spiritual, and newly aware of the world around her. That she enters puberty in a time of madness, and deftly describes that madness, will prompt immediate comparisons to Anne Frank—not inappropriately.

MOLYDA SZYMUSIAK (she uses her adopted surname) writes with her eyes open from the start:

> It had been more than six months since we had been jolted out of our life in Phnom Penh, and everything we had been used to had been turned upside down. We had learned about the hard lives of those who work the land. I hadn't known anything about how rice was grown, and there I was, watching its green stems shoot up out of the water. I had transplanted the seedlings into muddy rice fields along with the other inhabitants of this village where my family had refuge. The ears of rice had formed and were swelling "like a young woman expecting a baby," as we say in Khmer.

The rice she had planted was denied her and her family. They were shipped off from this village in a second deportation to the northwestern zone of the country, where life was crueler and where these former city people were expected to become pioneers, clearing jungle and planting new fields with little help. Heat, disease, despair, regular humiliation, and neglect—cruelty both stupid and sadistic—killed off her family as much as physical abuse by the leaders of their dirt-poor collective. Nothing improved, either for her or for her opposites, the rural poor who expected to profit from the revolution. Only she and three cousins survived the nearly four years of Khmer Rouge rule to witness its horrid climax, when the rural poor and communist overseers who were to benefit from the revolution became its victims.

She sees the evidence of their destruction:

> Keeping my eyes lowered, at first I didn't dare look at all the horrors on display in the courtyard around me, but after a moment I felt someone staring at me and I looked up. A woman was on her knees, her arms tied behind her back, while in front of her a baby held out his hands to her breast; he wasn't strong enough to sit up, and she

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couldn't bend over far enough to let him suckle. I felt that she was imploring me to help her, but my feet were nailed to the ground. Not far from her were other women sitting against the wall or stretched out, their bellies swollen as if they were about to give birth. I couldn't do anything for these women, many of whom had been very cruel to us. Now they were crushed.

The Stones Cry Out can be read and appreciated without any previous knowledge of Cambodia or the Khmer Rouge. Szymusiak does not try to explain the revolution, nor does she try to filter her experience through political ideologies. She is a witness, nothing more and nothing less. And by the end of her book, the reader is at a loss to explain the insanity.

This book is certainly an antidote to some of the theories propounded by Kiernan. The hell she describes cannot be explained away by saying the Cambodian communists' basic problem was failing to follow the Vietnamese. Given the monstrosity of Pol Pot's rule, it should have been easy to win the hearts and minds of the Cambodian people over to a liberation by Vietnam. But the fact is that the Vietnamese threw away the opportunity. To this day, seven years after they overthrew the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese have failed to revitalize the Cambodian economy. Child malnutrition is on the rise, the rice crops are worse nearly every year, transportation is awful, there is no incentive among the people to improve their lives. The capital gives the impression that people are camping out, not establishing a new life, waiting to see if the Vietnamese will ever leave, if there is anything behind Indochinese solidarity beyond compulsory political education.

BUT WHAT OF life in Vietnam, the capital of communist Indochina? Few Vietnamese have published memoirs on postwar Vietnam. Doan Van Toai's *Vietnamese Gulag* was first published in French, and it has now been translated into English. It is a story told by a married man, a father, with a political past and a political viewpoint. And it is largely a story of life in the prisons, not on the streets, of postwar Vietnam.

Toai's book also includes the story of his life before imprisonment, which takes up half the book and unfortunately does not work as well as the narrative of his imprisonment. Toai has become an activist trying to promote Western interest in human rights abuses in Vietnam—a noble cause; but his book gives the impression of having molded his previous life to fit his new image. The drama of his story has a way of occasionally eroding its credibility. He writes more as a spokesman, not enough as a witness, and some of his opinions seem too much born of hindsight. (I wonder if Toai's co-author, the American David Chanoff, helped him too much, making him sound more like a Lanny Budd character than an educated South Vietnamese.) Still, his book is an essential addition to the literature on Vietnam. His account fills a large gap in our understanding of the goals and methods of the Vietnamese leadership.

DOAN VAN TOAI was a minor student activist during the war in South Vietnam. Within the first few months of martial law under the North Vietnamese Army, he was imprisoned for political crimes he says he did not commit. But mistake or not, he spent two years in various cells in Saigon, newly named Ho Chi Minh City. Prisons in Vietnam today are more than the underside of the new society; they are the mirrors as well. Toai does not, probably cannot, describe the entire gulag of his title, the gulag of prisons that exists throughout Vietnam. But he tells graphically and unforgettably of his imprisonment in cells around the city, providing particularly vivid accounts of his fellow prisoners, a catalog of people considered dangerous by the authorities: a monk who translated Western philosophers before 1975; a communist who was captured during the war by the Saigon regime, switched allegiances to save his life, and was arrested immediately after the communist victory as a traitor; the former dean of Saigon's law school; a Catholic priest; common criminals; students.

Clearly this was not a prison holding people convicted of crimes, but an institution for locking away those who were considered inconvenient. As Toai says, it was strictly speaking not a prison at all, since that implies a system of justice, which did not exist. One prisoner in Toai's cell was a member of the Party who refused to blame the Party for jailing him. His story is testimony to the supremacy of the Party, its all-knowing and all-powerful quality that forms the bedrock of the new Indochina. He tells Toai:

> There is capitalism, there is colonialism, and only one force can counter them, in spite of its errors. That's the Communist Party. . . . The party's methods . . . are brutal and unreasonable that's true. But apart from the Communist Party, which party can you trust? None is more honest, more intransigent. Even if it is sometimes unfair, there is no other way but the party's way.

The reports on Vietnam's prison systems produced by *Index on Censorship* in London and by Amnesty International confirm Toai's chilling accounts. Political prisons are still filled with men and women—dissidents, not just former members of the defeated regime and army—who

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are not formally charged with crimes and are never sentenced. Some of these horrors fall under the ubiquitous "re-education" program, which the Vietnamese claim is superior to the Western system of Nuremberg-style war crimes trials.

How Vietnam handles Cambodia and its "Hanoi Pact" will determine Vietnam's future well into the next century. Following the recent death of Le Duan, the Communist Party chief, there have been numerous predictions that a new, younger generation of leaders will take over and institute economic and social reforms. But reforms alone can be of little help to Vietnam's dismal economy without a major infusion of capital. And that capital will be blocked so long as China and much of the international community continue their boycott of Vietnam over the question of Cambodia. In its isolation Vietnam will remain impoverished, and totally dependent on the Soviet Union. All for the dream of an Indochinese bloc.

And Cambodia .... One can only dream of peace for that country. Today it is locked in the cruel dilemma of either accepting Vietnamese occupation or allowing the return of Pol Pot—Indochinese communism or the Khmer Rouge. The arguments are so old, so bitter, so bound up in countless blood debts that neither side shows any sign of giving up. They seem to take pride in their refusal to consider meaningful discussions of peace, or the prosperity that would follow for both Vietnam and Cambodia if the Indochinese wars finally ended.

ERRANDS INTO THE WILDERNESS

Cities on a Hill: A Journey Through Contemporary American Cultures by Frances FitzGerald

(Simon and Schuster, 414 pp., $19.95)

Early in this book, Frances FitzGerald describes having watched, as a child in New York City, television commercials that showed "a family at breakfast in a sunlit kitchen, the two towheaded children clamoring for Sugar Pops and Tastee Treats, their mother lovingly explaining how she kept the wash so clean and their father kissing her, then waving at a neighbor as he went off to work." Though she personally "knew no one who lived this suburban family idyll," she says, "[at] the same time I was quite convinced that this was the way most Americans lived."

This idea—that there is a simple, virtuous, sweetly dull American heartland—is immensely appealing, not just to cereal marketers but also to politicians and journalists. (Not that it isn't appealing to people in the heartland, too, as a kind of self-justifying myth.) Unfortunately, once you actually get there the idea lasts about five minutes. Even in Nebraska people are power hungry and neurotic. FitzGerald may once have believed in a Norman Rockwell America, but by the time she began this book she realized that the country was rapidly becoming less, excuse the term, normal—rearranging itself according to cultural affinities that heightened the differences in the way people live.

In researching her version of the Real America, she was drawn not to the secular, domestic suburbs, but to the kinds of places that usually give rise to horrified weirdo stories in the press. The common thread she was looking for is that quintessential American trait, the desire to cast aside everything and start anew. She chose to write about four self-invented communities: the gay district of San Francisco, Jerry Falwell's empire in Lynchburg, a Midwestern retirees' town in Florida called Sun City, and the Rajneeshee commune in central Oregon. All of them are made up of migrants who came by personal choice to start over; all use some degree of doctrine and ritual to help make the transition dramatically complete. As FitzGerald points out, there is a similarity, rhetorically at least, between the gays' "coming out" and the fundamentalists' being "born again." Rather than aberrations, these communities are really, to FitzGerald, the most visible manifestations of a wholesale transformation of American society over the last generation; to understand them, she seems to believe, is to learn a much broader lesson, too.

Cities on a Hill (the title comes from a phrase in John Winthrop's pre-landing speech to his shipmates that, thanks to its constant use by President Reagan, has been reduced almost to meaninglessness) is a collection of magazine pieces, with an introduction and conclusion apparently added later. As a book it suffers somewhat from having been written in self-contained parts. Still, the pieces themselves are excellent, and they stand up to republication much better than most magazine work. This is a tribute not just to FitzGerald, but also to the magazine in which the stories appeared, *The New Yorker*. It's true that *New Yorker*-haters will find much to dislike in FitzGerald's book: the leads that amble on for thousands of words before getting to the point, the affectless prose, the air of unawareness that the subject of a story has been covered in great detail in other organs of the press that one's readers are likely already to have seen. I was unwilling to believe that I could read with pleasure another description of the murder of Harvey Milk and the AIDS crisis in San Francisco, or of the rise of the Moral Majority. But it turns out that having the time to do months of reporting without being expected to produce a sensational investigative conclusion really does produce results, at least when FitzGerald is the reporter.

In the chapter on Sun City, her argument that the segregation of the elderly is a new and important phenomenon is certainly convincing, but the Sun Citians' aggressive Midwestern wholesomeness—golf, neat lawns, and so on—is so overwhelming that it, rather than their age (or their denial of their age), seems to define the place. The other three pieces, though, which are all about familiar subjects, do succeed in "making it new." FitzGerald's secret is to shed the neutral journalistic inclination to dwell on the communities' most obvious departures from convention. Instead she takes them seriously, and treats their justifying doctrines as serious clues to their essence rather than as mumbo jumbo.

In the case of Falwell, she understands that his church is an agent of

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assimilation for Southerners in the middle of the journey from white trash to suburbanite, and that the Moral Majority demonizes the Eastern liberal establishment for the purpose of bleeding off hostility that might otherwise be inconveniently directed at the patrician business leadership of Lynchburg. She is tough on Falwell himself, but for the right reason: not because he represents the leading edge of American fascism, but because he's a bit of a flimflam man.

In the San Francisco chapter she has the nerve to offer a convincing, empathetic, non-hysterical explanation of why gay men, on average, have so many more sex partners than either gay women or straights. And her discussion of the individual struggle to overcome "internalized homophobia" helps clear up another mystery, the behavior of the faction in the gay leadership that long refused to advocate safe sex because it equated condemning the bathhouses with self-hatred. On the Rajneeshees, she captures the mix of Buddhism, Esalenism, Jonestownism, and charlatanism that was at the heart of the commune—again in a way that makes her portrayal the definitive look at a much-covered subject.

FITZGERALD'S final chapter begins with the notion, made popular by Richard Hofstadter and other intellectuals in the '50s, that status anxiety and cultural change can shape political behavior, and then lengthily compares her four subjects to the various communitarian movements of the Second Great Awakening in upstate New York during the 1840s. (By the way, though FitzGerald is scrupulous about citing academics, she seems to have gone out of her way not to mention Tom Wolfe, who has been writing about the starting-over urge in America for at least 20 years, and who also made the Second Great Awakening comparison ten years ago in "The Me Decade.") Her argument is that a thin sense of history, a constancy of change, a mutability of culture, and a faith in the ability of the individual to transform everything about himself are not new attributes of the American character. They are constants. Times of great demographic change, such as the 1840s and the 1960s, tend to underscore these traits, to throw up cults, communes, and movements.

These are almost never as threatening as they seem—especially as they have seemed in the decades since Hitler became lodged in our minds as the example par excellence of the cult leader. America has always been in a "condition of turbulence." And lately the development of the national mass press has made it impossible for any dangerous cult to enjoy the kind of prolonged isolation that it would need to become large enough and strong enough to constitute a serious threat. FitzGerald ends with a reassuring quotation from Tocqueville: "Aristocratic nations are naturally too liable to narrow the scope of human perfectability; democratic nations to expand it beyond reason."

I'm sure FitzGerald is right that the excesses of American life are rooted in freedom, mobility, and abundance, rather than in something darker, like authoritarianism. But to conclude on such a note somewhat diminishes the book. There is a similarity of rhythm in the lives of her communities (utopian dreams turning sour) that obscures how different they really are. Some exercises in self-segregation, such as the Rajneeshee commune or the experiment in Oneida during the 1840s, end without leaving deep marks, or any marks at all, on the larger society. Others, such as Falwell's Liberty Baptist complex or, earlier, the Mormons, arrive at some accommodation with the mainstream that leaves them healthy and influential. The gays, as FitzGerald sees it, are in the second category, headed not toward AIDS-induced self-immolation but toward increasing acceptance in politics and business.

The lesson of cults and communes is, it's true, the one FitzGerald draws: they will recur periodically, and they won't be anything to worry about. On the other hand, the second kind of starting over group—the one in which people leave old homes and old selves, enter some kind of community of the like-minded, and end by re-entering American society at a place where they feel both more comfortable and more successful—is closer to the essence of America. It has long been intellectually disrespectable to take starting over seriously as a workable mass process in this country; FitzGerald is on the verge of a breakthrough here. It's too bad that she vitiates it by leaving the impression that all four of her communities are essentially the same. They're not. They represent two distinctly different phenomena—one an interesting sideshow, the other the main event.

NICHOLAS LEMANN

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JIMMY'S WORLD

Morality, Reason & Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years by Gaddis Smith

(Hill and Wang, 296 pp., $18.95)

Gaddis Smith, a fine diplomatic historian, has written a crisp and compact, thoughtful and thought-provoking history of the diplomatic record of the Carter administration. There is a big omission: foreign economic policy. This is too bad, because that part of the story would have strengthened the conclusions Smith derives from Carter's security policy. It was, like the rest, a tale of contradiction and vacillation: the contradiction between the concern for world order and the initial attempt at reviving the domestic economy (even at the cost of inflation at home and abroad and a falling dollar that played havoc with our allies' exports), and the vacillation that led, after warnings about the domestic political costs of inflation, and after violent West German protests, to the policy reversal of late 1978—which in turn resulted in a recession just in time for the election of 1980!

What interests Smith is the way in which the Carter administration tried to cope with the four philosophical prob-

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lems he deems constant in America's efforts at playing a world role: power versus morality, "externalists" (who believe that foreign policy is dictated by external threats) versus "internalists" (who think that the driving forces are internal and usually "unworthy" or evil), unlimited interests versus limited interests, and a strategy of "prevailing" (or of primacy) versus a policy of world order. Carter started as a champion of morality, as an internalist, as a man obsessed by such world order issues as the taming of nuclear weapons, the curtailing of arms sales, and the defense of human rights. He ended, in 1980, as a cold warrior, with a vast rearmament program, sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union, no arms control agreement, and in full retreat on human rights.

CONTRADICTIONS and reversals are wryly noted and documented throughout the book, which uses the main actors' memoirs as well as published diplomatic documents. Contradiction plagued Carter's approach to the Soviet Union. We had to overcome our "inordinate fear of Communism" and work with Moscow to reduce the nuclear threat, but the Soviet Union was "the epitome of evil" against which American virtue had to be "defined and preserved." It plagued the conception of the MX missile: Was the MX an insurance policy against the (theoretical) vulnerability of the Minuteman missiles or a first-strike weapon against Soviet missile silos? And how could it be reconciled with arms control? A still further contradiction weighed on Carter's policy toward Latin America: he sincerely wanted to put an end to paternalism (hence his admirable effort on the Panama Canal settlement), but he also wanted to prod delinquent states on human rights and nonproliferation. In Nicaragua and in El Salvador, his policy fell between two stools: his concern for, if not democracy, at least decency, and his fear of communism.

The biggest contradiction of all, of course, was between Carter's two principal advisers. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser, was the quintessential power player, whose policy reflected the hard-line strictures of that key document of the early cold war, NSC-68, adopted in 1950—a document that recommended a massive worldwide military effort against the Soviet menace and that Smith considers "fundamentally anti-democratic" and the essence of anti-Wilsonian "realism." (One must note, however, that the cold war "realists," even when they advocated very dubious means, did not consider themselves immoral or amoral: because the Soviet Union was evil and a mortal threat, it was moral, in their eyes, to take any necessary measures for the defense and victory of our values. Thus they managed to sound both realistic and ethical, whereas the pure Wilsonian idealists always suffered from an appearance of naïveté and weakness.) Brzezinski was one of those men who described the Soviet Union both as a mortal threat and as a weak state whose disintegration an intelligently led America could hasten. Cyrus Vance's approach to Moscow was "reassurance," not "intimidation and confrontation." Brzezinski laid a bipolar grid on the world; Vance saw the world as a complex mass (or a complex mess) of largely autonomous regional issues and of global problems that could only be solved cooperatively.

The main theme of Smith's analysis is the gradual victory of the power-happy externalist Brzezinski over Vance, and over Carter's initial inclinations. For security reasons, the human rights policy was drastically toned down in the cases of Iran, the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Korea—especially after the invasion of Afghanistan. The fear of nuclear proliferation was subordinated to the desire for good nuclear relations with Pakistan, as well as with India. American policy toward the armament of Japan moved from hostility to prodding encouragement. Normalization of relations with China turned into the quest for a strategic relationship aimed at Moscow—a quest that also led to American diplomatic support for Pol Pot's regime in exile, in opposition to the Cambodian puppet government set up by the Vietnamese, with whom the administration had earlier tried to restore diplomatic ties. Carter, who had wanted to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, ended up promulgating Presidential Directive 59, which outlined a strategy for fighting a nuclear war.

HOW DOES Smith account for this transformation? He rightly mentions the role Moscow played in undercutting Carter: "in the waning years of Brezhnev," Soviet policy was even more marked by "suspicion, rigidity, and insensitivity" than usual. "By failing to respond to conciliation they [the Soviets] drove conciliation from the field"—and made it easier for American cold warriors to exaggerate Moscow's misdeeds (as in the case of the Yemen crisis, the Shaba incidents, and the ludicrous episode of the Soviet brigade in Cuba). Smith also points to Carter's "lack of experience and historical perspective," to his penchant for hyperbole, and to his susceptibility to flattery. He discusses Carter's bad luck in economic affairs—a point that should be given broader scope, because in the security realm, too, Carter suffered from bad luck. He came to power just as the policies of the Kissinger era were unraveling, and he had to cope with this disintegration, in arms control as well as in Africa and in Iran.

Smith's final word is that

> Carter failed because he asked the American people to think as citizens of the world with an obligation toward future generations. He offered a morally responsible and farsighted vision. But the clamor of political critics, the behavior of the Soviet Union, the discordant voices of his advisers, and the impossibility of seeing clearly what needed to be done—all combined to make Carter's vision appear naive. In 1980, he fell back on an appeal to the combative nationalistic instincts of the American people.

All of this is true, but a few nuances should be added.

FIRST, AS SMITH himself indicates in various passages, Carter was in the beginning the victim of a discrepancy between his own initial vision and the mood of Congress and the public. Smith points out that Carter in 1976 was the first champion of peace to prevail over the candidate of strength (or, rather, of strength *and* peace). But Congress and the public, in tune with Carter in 1976, soon became far more worried about strength and Soviet expansion, even though Carter himself never cut the military budget—indeed, he raised it after his first year in office. The story of this change in mood remains to be told. In 1976, says Smith, Carter "was like a surfer . . . in precisely the right position to catch the one wave of the day that will carry him all the way." He tried to surf again in 1980, but it was too late: Reagan could ride that particular wave much more successfully.

Secondly, the "impossibility of seeing clearly what needed to be done" deserves more analysis. Carter's chief weakness seems to have been an inability to appreciate the seriousness of the contradictions that confronted him, a belief that all good things must be compatible. But, as Smith shows again and again, all his administration produced were case-by-case deci-

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sions. There were no general guidelines, for example, on how to reconcile human rights considerations with security concerns or on how to handle conflicts among world order issues.

Thirdly, one of Carter's problems was that he and his advisers believed, like all American officials since Truman and Acheson and unlike George Kennan, in the unlimited scope of American interests. To be sure, Carter initially defined them, with Vance, in a very different way from the global "us versus them" definition of the cold war years, and even of the Kissinger era. (He, too, thought that essential American interests were at stake all over the world.) But the very concern for "global issues" led to a global activism that was both indiscriminate and clumsy; and once that approach turned out to be unworkable, reverting to the standard definition of unlimited interests—the definition given in NSC-68—was easy. I am not suggesting that the world order issues were not vital, only that it was a mistake to deal with them without a sense of hierarchy or priorities, and as if they were exclusively or primarily America's mission.

Finally, when all this has been said, it is still not clear that Carter's defeat in 1980 was caused by an unpopular foreign policy. Public opinion polls taken at the time of the 1980 election showed a slim majority preferring his foreign policy to Reagan's. It was the economy that got Reagan elected in 1980 and re-elected in 1984.

This does not mean that Carter's diplomacy in any way succeeded—not even in the Middle East. He raised or sharpened issues that will not disappear, and that the Reagan administration, for all its concentration on the contest with Moscow, has found embarrassing: how to move away from the nuclear conundrum through arms reductions and nonproliferation policies, how to protect human rights in countries over which the United States has influence, how to keep the international economic order safe from protectionism and bankruptcy, how to develop a farsighted oil policy. Carter was unable to give satisfactory answers to these questions, and with Moscow's help he fell back on what was familiar. But the Reagan administration, itself wedded to the familiar, is not succeeding much better in a world in which the Soviets now seem, belatedly and inconsistently (as the Daniloff affair shows), to want to play the kind of role that would, had they played it in 1977-79, have helped Carter do better than he was able to do. A satisfactory, balanced, and integrated definition of American interests is yet to be achieved.

STANLEY HOFFMANN

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TRB, *from page 4*

questions. Do individual journalists have opinions about the subjects they cover? Do journalists as a class share a particular set of opinions? Does this affect their ability to portray the world fairly? And if so, what should be done about it?

Yes, journalists have opinions. Journalists are intelligent, curious people with an interest in public affairs. The idea that such people should or even could spend their lives inquiring into the important issues of the day without reaching conclusions about them is absurd.

LRL detect certain shared psychological predispositions among journalists that they characterize as liberal. An "inner ambivalence toward power may be displaced outward as antagonism toward seekers and holders of power," they write. And then there's narcissism, which creates a tendency toward "knocking other people down."

For all I know, LRL are right about what's going on inside journalists' heads. No man is responsible for his subconscious. But it's typical of LRL's cloddish unsubtlety that they identify skepticism toward authority and a tendency toward dyspepsia as politically liberal traits. And it's typical of their complete misunderstanding of journalism that they suppose these traits are a disadvantage in covering the news accurately.

Actually, though most of LRL's "research" is nonsense, I don't quarrel with the straightforward polls showing that journalists vote liberal more often than the general population. The important question is, So what? Here, LRL are at their most disingenuous, insisting that they are not accusing anyone of bias. Their concern is "infinitely more subtle." In fact, "Our effort is aimed at eliminating the false dichotomy between a 'true' and a 'biased' story." And, "The whole notion of bias has become a straw man." (Although the mask slips at one point and they note that many leading journalists "are willing to admit to problems of bias.")

But if *The Media Elite* is not a criticism of the press and an implicit demand for change, what is it? This is exactly how it is regarded, of course, by the people who have embraced LRL's findings. And as far as I know, LRL have not renounced such supporters or declined their lecture fees. The clear argument built into *The Media Elite* is that there is something improper about a situation where most journalists hold liberal political views. So what should be done? Must individual journalists change their opinions to keep up with the times? Or should media institutions practice affirmative action by political views in order to reflect accurately the breakdown of liberals and conservatives in the general population?

Not just political views, either. LRL note that journalists are disproportionately irreligious. In fact, they are a "cosmopolitan group . . . raised at some distance from the social and cultural traditions of small-town middle America." Is it time to apply some sort of Norman Rockwell urine test for admission to journalism? If so, it's one that most Americans would flunk, since very few people actually grew up in the idealized small-town America of LRL's imagination. Then, too, if cosmopolitan values and lifestyles are to be considered a disqualification for journalism, why shouldn't the same standard apply to other so-called "elites" such as sociologists or members of the Reagan administration? I see Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle just returned from his annual *vacances* in France.

Of course journalists have political opinions and social attitudes, and of course these sometimes affect the way they write. But most reporters have no ideological agenda when they write a story. And they try to be objective. The same cannot be said of Lichter, Rothman, and Lichter.

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WASHINGTON DIARIST

Stranger In Paradise

SYDNEY BIDDLE BARROWS, the so-called Mayflower Madam, who enjoyed a lively 15 minutes of fame a few years ago when she was nabbed for running an upscale Manhattan call girl operation, was in Washington recently to publicize her book and self. She's looking, she told the *Post*, for a new line of work. She seems to have considered most of the options that '80s America offers to those blessed with mild notoriety and a talent for self-promotion: talk-show hosting, fashion design, novel writing, and investment banking. Why everyone whose name has appeared in a headline or two suddenly wants to write a novel is beyond me. Unless you can afford to hire someone else to do the actual work, authoring a book is a tedious business. Investment banking is much the smarter move, and Barrows appears to have the right instincts. Asked by the *Post*'s Myra MacPherson whether she didn't feel some compunction about having run a business that consisted of hiring young women to have sex for pay with strangers, Barrows shot back: "What you're saying is that it would have been OK if these girls had gone to Maxwell's Plum two or three nights a week and let some guy pick them up and walk them home and get it for free." The *Post* reporter evidently found this logic a bit recondite, but she'd been in Washington too long. I recognized instantly, and with a pang of homesickness, the credo of the contemporary Manhattanite: If you've got it, rent it.

EVERYONE WHO DOES NOT live in Manhattan, where I've spent most of the past 12 years, seems to think that the inconvenience, expense, and general aggravation of New York life are things no one would deliberately choose to experience. And thus it is that every New Yorker who visits people out of town is fated to undergo a recitation of all the quality-of-life reasons why their city, suburb, or rural outpost has it all over New York. Patience is required for these discussions because they tend to a certain circularity: there is no arguing with people who think that, for instance, not having to lock your car when you run into the store is the mark of an advanced culture. The New Yorker who visits Washington should be prepared to suffer the following put-downs:

Washington has a better subway system than New York. When Washingtonians lead with this card, you know they have a weak hand. A good subway system should have these virtues: it should run 24 hours a day every day; it should take you from any place you might reasonably be to any place you might reasonably want to go; it should be crowded enough to force you to negotiate for space with persons you would ordinarily walk across the street to avoid. Washington's subway system fails on all three counts. You can't get home at two in the morning; you can't get to Georgetown, or to the Kennedy Center, at any time of day; and you can almost always get a seat in a clean, well-lighted car. Those who imagine that this last feature is somehow the point of a good subway system have not grasped the true meaning of the word "public" in the phrase "public transportation." In New York these people take cabs.

Washington has nice low buildings and reasonable traffic patterns: it's a city on a human scale. But the spirit of a city is a function of the density of its street life, and taller buildings make for busier sidewalks—which is why New York is such an unbeatable city for walking. There is a downside to size, though—Donald Trump, for instance, the developer who cleaned up in the early '70s by buying Manhattan real estate at the bottom of the market, and who, with the cooperation of New York's development-happy mayor, seems intent on seeing how closely Manhattan might be made to resemble Houston. His latest vision is a massive complex on the West Side, to be called, with a banality that nicely complements the design, Television City. Trump's strategy for inspiring public enthusiasm for this boondoggle is to promise that it will boast not only the world's largest shopping mall and the world's largest television studio, but the world's tallest skyscraper as well, a distinction that currently belongs to Chicago. This appeal to the self-regard of New Yorkers, who are supposed by people like Trump and George Steinbrenner (the quintessential out-of-towner) to want to be No. 1 in every category, is entirely bogus, of course, and involves a complete misapprehension of the kind of thing New Yorkers care about. Most New Yorkers think that having the tallest building in the world is just the kind of thing a Chicagoan would be proud of.

New York is a city wholly given over to the culture of money. The higher criticism. It's true that when New Yorkers get tired of talking about the market value of their apartment they take a break by talking about how much the wine cost. But my impression is that money is pretty much what people talk about in Washington, too. It's just that there's less of it.

ON THE TIME-HONORED assumption that the novel is the form of writing that captures best the stuff of actual experience—"culture's hum and buzz of implication," as Trilling called it—I recently picked up Sally Quinn's *No Regrets*, whose jacket copy informed me that "this is *the* Washington novel." Until I read this book I had no idea of what really goes on at the level of hum and buzz here. I had always taken Washington to be a buttoned-up, workaholic sort of place. No more. In *No Regrets*, a town was revealed that my brief experience at TNR had done little to prepare me for—a town of powerless politicians, powerful hostesses, and *incredibly* powerful journalists, all with just one thing on their minds. Here is the story's romantic lead, "Des" (a name I thought Harold Robbins had retired), bureau chief of the powerful *Weekly*, who is about to end a marriage of 25 years to shack up with "Sonny," blond star reporter at the powerful *Daily* (being a stranger in town, I have no idea who these folks might be): "Des walked around the corner to the house on Twenty-first Street and got into his old white Thunderbird convertible. 'Get more pussy with this baby than you can get flies with honey,' he muttered routinely to himself as he patted the car on the dash and turned the corner into Florida Avenue." *Muttered routinely?* I can see that there are some Washington habits it's going to take a while to learn.

L.M.

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